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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XXXVI

DECEMBER,

1929

NUMBER 1

REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL REFORM OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PLEADING
AND PRACTICE IN WEST VIRGINIA.
THURMAN

W. ARNOLD*

JAMES W.

SIMONTON*

HAROLD C.

HAVIGHURST*

This Report was submitted by the Committee on Judicial
Administration and Legal Reform to the West Virginia Bar

Association at its annual meeting at White Sulphur Springs
on the tenth day of September, 1929. The Bar Association
after hearing the papers of Dean Charles E. Clark and
Professor Edson R. Sunderland, which are printed in this
issue of the Quarterly, voted to approve the idea of a Judicial LCouncil. Inasmuch as the somewhat bulky report
had not been read by most of the members of the Association at the time of the meeting it was decided that the matters of procedure contained in the report should be again
referred to the next succeeding Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform for study during the coming year, and that a report on this method of procedure
and on the details of the Judicial ,Council Act should be
submitted to the meeting of the Association in 1930.
*Members of the Faculty of the College of Law, West Virginia University.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss1/3

2

Arnold et al.: Report to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Refo

TABLE O
II.

CONTENTS-(CONTINUED)

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
PAGE

PURPOSE AND

SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT PROCEDURE

------------------------

26

DRAFT OF ACT AMENDING 'MOTION FOR JUDG-

MENT PROCEDURE ----------------------

35

Sees. 1 to 5

35

See. 6.
See. 7.
Sec. 8.
Sec. 9.
Sec. 10.
Sec. 11.
'See. 12.
Sec. 13.
See. 14.
See. 15.
'See. 16.
See. 17.
'See. 18.
See. 19.
See. 20.
CO

------------------------------

Motion for Judgment; Discontinuance-35
Joinder of Claims and Parties; Counterclaims -----------------------------36
Alternate Section 7 -----------------37
Affidavit of Claim; Judgment --------- 37
Notice of Defense; Further Pleading --- 38
Notice of Defense to Counterclaim ----39
Verification of Pleading -------------39
Objection to Pleading ---------------39
Alternate Section 12 ----------------40
Summary Disposition of Certain Defenses -----------------------------40
Matters in Abatement --------------41
Trial ------------------------------41
Variance --------------------------41
Summary Judgments in Certain Cases-42
Commencement of Proceeding ---------43
Other Provisions of Law Applicable_-43
Forms -----------------------------43

ENT ON PROPOSED ACT AMENDING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT PROCEDURE ------See. 6.
See. 7.

Motion for Judgment; Continuance .Joinder of Claims and of Parties;
Counterclaims ----------------------See. 8. Affidavit of Claim-Judgment --------Sec. 9. Notice of Defense-Further Pleading_
Sec. 10. Notice of Defense to Counterclaim ....
See. 11. Verification of Pleadings -------------See. 12. Objection to Pleading ----------------

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

44
44
44
51
53
56
56
56

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS-(CONCLUDED)
PAGE

Sec. 13.
Sec. 14.
See. 15.
Sec. 16.
Sec. 17.
Sec. 18.
Sec. 19.
Sec. 20.

Summary Disposition of Certain Defenses --------------------------Matters in Abatement --------------Trial ---------------------------Variance ------------------------Summary Judgments in Certain Cases_Commencement of Proceeding -------Other Provisions of Law Applicable ---Forms ---------------------------

58
59
59
60
61
64
66
66

EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF PLEADING ACTUALLY RAISED ON MOTION PROCEDURE AS COMPARED
WITH COMMON LAv PROCEDURE IN THE LAST TEN
VOLUMES OF THE VIRGINIA REPORTS -------------

68

INVESTIGATION AMONG JUDGES, ATTORNEYS AND CLERKS
IN VIRGINIA WITH TABULATED REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRES

-------------------------------

SCHEDULE OF FORMS ----------------Acknowledgments

72-83 inc.
84-103 inc.

--------------------------------

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss1/3

104

4

Arnold et al.: Report to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Refo

(First Page Table of Contents)
FOREWORDOUTLINE OF PROPOSAL-OUTLINE
3fETHODS----------------------------------

Page
oF
5

DRAFT OF ACT PROVIDING FOR JUDICIAL
COUNCIL -------------------------------Sec. 1.
Sec. 2.
Sec. 3.
Sec. 4.
Sec. 5.
Sec. 6.
Sec. 7.
COMMENT

Judicial Council-Establishment and
Purposes -------------------------Appointment and Term of Office ...
Duties and Powers of the Judicial
Council -------------------------Bureau of Statistics --------------Rules of Pleading and Practice ----Bureau of Research ---------------Expenses ------------------------O JUDICIAL COUNCIL ACT -----

9
9
9
10
10
11
12
12
12

Sec. 1.
Sec. 2.
:Sec. 3.

Establishment and Purposes--------Appointment and Term of Office ...
Duties and Powers of the Judicial
Council --------------------------

12
13

See. 4.
Sec. 5.

Bureau of Statistics -------------Rules of Pleading and Practice -----

14
15

Sec. 6.
'Sec. 7.

Bureau of Research ---------------Expenses -------------------------

15
15

14

(Third Page Table of Contents)
EXA-MINATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF PLEADING AcTUALLY RAISED ON MOTION PROCEDURE AS COrPARED WITH CO-MMON LAW PROCEDURE IN THE
LAST TEN VOLUMES OF THE VIRGINIA REPORTS
INVESTIGATION AMiONG JUDGES, ATTORNEYS AND
CLERKS IN VIRGINIA WITH TABULATED REPLIES
TO QUESTIONNAIRES --------------------70-82

SCHEDULE OF FORMS -----------------

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

67
inc.

83-102 inc.

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC.

To the Committee on Judicial Administration and Reform,
West Virginia State Bar Association:
FOREWORD
This report is a result of a resolution passed by the Bar
Association requesting the faculty of the College of Law to
study chapter 125 of the Code and make suggestions concerning the pleading and practice in law cases. The idea
behind that resolution was that it would be profitable
for the faculty of the law school to devote its time to a
study of the legal problems of West Virginia. The request for a study of pleading came first no doubt because it
is one of the questions uppermost in the mind of the public spirited lawyer all over the country. Every law school
and every bar association naturally wish to be at the front
in solving problems which are within their particular province. A simple and speedy method of procedure is not
only within the province of both the law school and the bar
but it lies at the heart of the administration of justice.
For this reason it was thought that recommendations on the
procedure might well be among the first pieces of research
to be done by the law faculty.
It should not be inferred from the fact that we are offering suggestions as to procedure that we think the procedure of West Virginia is particularly bad. On the contrary we believe that as procedure goes in the United States,
West Virginia has escaped many of the difficulties which
have involved other states. It has never been a state which
would refuse to listen to liberal ideas and our code of procedure is full of them. Nevertheless as conditions change
procedure as well as law must be constantly changed and
restated. Nothing remains the same very long. Every
system of rules must be continually revised and simplified. This process is much easier in a state where the procedure is not bad than in one where it is very bad. A thoroughly antiquated and cumbersome system of procedure offers so many opportunities to skillful lawyers that they
acquire a sort of vested interest in it which they are unwilling to give up without a struggle.
It does not require a revolution to keep a reasonably ef-
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ficient system up to date, and doubtless the fact that West
Virginia procedure today is reasonably efficient is one of
the reasons we are permitted to make suggestions to
the bar concerning it. We therefore present our suggestions not in a critical frame of mind but only believing that
to keep a procedure simple and efficient must require constant study, constant re-statement and constant experimentation.
To the College of Law a simplified procedure and the
omission of ancient rituals is of peculiar importance. If
ancient forms are used, their history must be studied. To
know the complicated logical machinery of the common law
requires years of study for an expert. Most of this machinery is seldom used, yet all of it might conceivably be
of use. [Most law schools give a general course in common
law procedure which covers its general outlines. West Virginia goes into detail and has more required procedural
courses than any other school. The general course in common law procedure will always be necessary. .The details
however take time which is devoted in other schools to the
study of problems of greater importance to the lawyer of
the future.
OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL
REFORM.
In brief our proposal consists of setting up machinery for
the continuous study of legal problems in West Virginia.
The motive power of this machinery consists in a judicial
council which has (1) rule-making power, (2) facilities
for research through the use of the faculty of the state law
school, and (3) bureau of statistics.
The history of the judicial council, the forms which this
device has taken in the various states and the compelling
reasons why one should be instituted in West Virginia are
summarized in the April issue of the West Virginia Law
Quarterly. We will not attempt to repeat these arguments
here. We have discussed the question of rule-making power
with Mr. Sunderland of the Michigan Law School faculty
and he has kindly consented to review the merits of this
proposal in a general way for the benefit of the West Virginia bar. This article appears in the June issue of the
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West Virginia Law Quarterly. We do not think it is
necessary therefore to cumber this record further with an
explanation of these arguments except to express our appreciation to Mr. Sunderland for his kindness in helping our
project, for which he has expressed the greatest enthusiasm.
In order to give a complete demonstration of a judicial
council with rule-making power it is necessary to picture
the machine in operation. We have therefore assumed that
we have a judicial council with rule-making power and
that the law faculty is the research unit of that judicial
council. Acting as such research unit we have drafted for
that judicial council its first proposed rules, which consist in an extension of the motion for judgment procedure.
If these suggestions were accepted by the judicial council
under the above assumption they would become the rules of
procedure in this state.
Nevertheless our proposal is so drawn that in the event
that a judicial council is not approved with such wide
powers, our suggestions could be passed as a legislative act
governing procedure. We suspect however that an examination of the complications involved in passing such an act
might provide a very convincing argument as to why the
rule-making power should be vested in a judicial council
rather than in a legislature. Such a body cannot possibly
have time to consider either the difficulties involved in
drafting an act or the faults of pleading which we are trying to remedy. In any event we have made our proposal so
that if any part does not receive the approval of the bar
association the rest may go forward independently.
OUTLINE OF THE METHODS OF RESEARCH.
It may be useful for the Bar to know just what authorities have been consulted and how the work has been carried
on.
In drafting the Judicial Council Act, we have examined the statutes in every state which has a judicial
council and have collected them all in the article in the
West Virginia Law Quarterly above referred to; we have
written to the judicial council in each state and obtained
reports where any are published; we have written to lawyers interested in the work in the various states where
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judicial councils have been successful; we have interviewed personally the members of the Judicial Council of
Massachusetts and discussed our problems with them. Results of our study and the conclusions are found in the
draft we submit and in the article to which we have referred.
We wish also to acknowledge our indebtedness to Mr.
Sunderland of Michigan, and Dean Clark of Yale, with
whom we have conferred at some length, and the draft of
our act contains many of their ideas.
In the drafting of the procedure on motion for judgment
in addition to consulting the statutes and literature on the
general topic we have made the following first hand investigation:
First: We have written letters and sent out questionnaires to all judges, all clerks of courts in Virginia and
about fifty representative lawyers. These questionnaires
were designed to ascertain just how this procedure worked
in Virginia. The results are summarized elsewhere in this
report.
Second: We have had personal conferences with lawyers and the Judge of the Circuit Court in Winchester,
Virginia, at which conference we went over our act in detail and were assured that it was practical and workable.
Third: We have spent ten days at Yale University going
over the act in great detail with Mr. Clark, Dean of the
Law School, Mr. Leon Green and Mr. Dodd of the Yale
Faculty. Numerous suggestions and criticisms were offered
in great detail and the act re-drafted as a result of the cooperation of the Faculty of Yale for whose work we wish to
express our appreciation and indebtedness.
While the frame work of the act comes from Virginia
and West Virginia, its various suggestions and proposals
were taken from England, Canada, 'Connecticut, New York
and we are particularly indebted to Mr. Sunderland's Code
of Civil Procedure on which he has spent some years' work
in Michigan.
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I. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
DRAFT

OF ACT PROVIDING FOR JUDICIAL
CO!UNCIL.

Section 1.--Judiial Counil--Establishment and Purposes.
There is hereby created a Judicial Council for the continuous study of organization, rules and methods of procedure and practice of the judicial system of the state. It
shall be composed of one Justice of the Supreme Court,
three Circuit Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Supreme 'Court of Appeals, and four practicing
attorneys and one member of the faculty of the College of
Law of West Virginia University, who shall be appointed
by the Governor. Not more than two judges and two attorneys shall be members of any one political party.
Section 2.-Appointment and Term of Office.
The executive council of the State Bar Association shall
submit to the President of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
nominations for judges to serve on the Judicial Council,
consisting of at least two names for each vacancy on said
Council. They shall also submit to the Governor of the
state a list of nominees selected from among the attorneys
of the state and from the faculty of the College of Law.
Three members shall be appointed to said Council for a
period of two years, one of whom shall be a judge, another
a practicing attorney, and the third, a member of the faculty of the College of Law of West Virginia University;
three members shall be appointed for a period of four
years, one of whom shall be a judge and two of whom
shall be practicing attorneys, and three members shall
be appointed for a period of six years, two of whom shall
be judges and one a practicing attorney. All appointments made thereafter shall be for a period of six years, except that in a case of vacancy the appointment shall be
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made to fill the unexpired term. The President of the Supreme -Court shall designate the time and place of the
first meeting.
Section 3.-Duties and Powers of the Judicial Council.
The Judicial Council shall from time to time
(1) Meet at the call of the chairman who shall be selected by the Council from its members;
(2) Survey the conditions of business in the several
courts of the state with a view of improving the administration of justice, and submit such suggestions to the
courts as they may deem advisable;
(3) Report to the Governor and to the Legislature at
the convening of each regular session, such recommendations as they may deem proper;
(4) Hold public hearings, administer oaths and require ihe attendance of witnesses and the production of
books and documents. The circuit court shall have power
to enforce obedience to summons issued by the Council
and compel the giving of testimony.
Section 4.-Bureau of Statistics.
The Council shall have the power to organize a Bureau
of Statistics for the purpose of gathering information relating to civil and criminal litigation. Judges, prosecuting
attorneys, sheriffs, and attorney general, clerks of the district court, superior officers of penal institutions and asylums and other county and municipal officers, boards and
commissions shall render such council such reports as it
may request on matters in the scope of its powers. The
clerks of the circuit courts of the -state shall prepare a statement semi-annually showing the cases filed and their disposition and such other information regarding litigation in
their respective courts as may be required under a method
of arrangement and upon forms to be furnished them by the
said Judicial Council, which statement shall be forwarded
to the Judicial -Council.
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Section 5.-Rules of Pleading and Practice.
The practice and procedure in actions at law or in equity
shall be as simple and non-technical as may be consistent
with the efficient administration of justice. In order to
carry out the details of this general provision the Judicial
Council shall have power to prescribe and establish by general rules, the process, writs, pleadings, verifications, motions and forms of action and the trial and appellate practice and procedure in civil actions at law and equity and in
the rendition, entry, opening or vacating of judgments or
orders therein. Such rules shall not abridge, modify or
enlarge the substantive rights of any litigant. When and
as the rules of procedure herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further
force or effect, provided, however, that this act shall not be
construed to deprive the courts of power to establish rules
for the conduct of their business not inconsistent with rules
promulgated by the Judicial Council or with -statutory law.
All rules promulgated by the Judicial Council shall go
into effect as follows:
(1) The chairman of said Council shall mail to each
judge, justice of the peace and clerk of the circuit court a
number of copies of each proposed rule, one of which copies
shall be posted by each of said officers in a prominent place
with the request that any objections by any judge or attorney to such proposed rule be put in writing and mailed
to the chairman of the Judicial Council.
(2) Forty -days after mailing the copies of said rules as
provided above, the Judicial Council may present the same
to the Supreme Court of Appeals for its approval. If
said rules are satisfactory to a majority of the Court it
shall by its order declare that said rules go into effect
thirty days thereafter.
(3) If it appear to a majority of the court that there
are substantial objections to any of said rules or that said
rules require further study or modification, the court shall
summon the chairman of the Judicial Council before it with
such other members of said council as may care to appear
to explain either the meaning of or the necessity for any of
said rules. If, after such hearing, a majority of the court
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is not satisfied with any rule no order putting said rule
into effect shall be entered.
Section 6.-Bureala of Research.
The faculty of the College of Law of West Virginia University shall constitute a Bureau of Research on legal problems and the legal aspects of industrial problems, in so far
as funds may be conveniently made available by West Virgoinia University for work in the summer time, and for
diminishing the teaching load of those members engaged on
said work during the school year. In so far as it may ,be
possible, without interfering with the teaching schedule of
the -College of Law, the faculty or members thereof designated by the Dean, shall prepare reports on matters within
the scope of the powers of investigation by said council.
Section 7.-Ewpenses.
All members of the Council shall serve without compensation but shall be paid their actual and necesary expenses
incurred in the performance of their duties. They may
further incur such expense for clerical help, the collection
of statistics and other matters in the scope of their purposes, which may be approved by the Governor. All bills
or accounts of the Council shall be approved by the Chairman and shall be audited and paid by the state as other
claims authorized by law.
'COMMENT ON JUDICIAL COUNCIL ACT.
Section 1.
(a) Number on the Council. The numbers on the judicial councils at present organized in the United States
vary from four to about forty. Large judicial councils
however do not seem to be effective. Those of Connecticut
and Massachusetts which are both outstanding have nine in
number. 'California has eleven.
(b) Personnel of the Council. The personnel of the
judicial councils in the United States differs widely. The
California Council which is one of the best consists entirely
of judges. Massachusetts has five judges and four attorneys. In 'Connecticut there are four judges, four attorneys
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and one state's attorney. Other judicial councils make the
attorney general an ex-officio member. Kansas and Washington include judges, attorneys and members of the legislature. North Dakota includes the dean of the state law
school. (See vol. 35 W. Va. Law Quar. 213.)
The reasons for the personnel selected in this draft are as
follows: The courts should not have a majority because
they should not be held responsible for the rules of procedure which are passed. To impose this responsibility
on them is to subject them to the criticism which inevitably
comes to a legislative 'body.
The reason that a member is selected from the law school
faculty is that the Law School represents the research machinery of the Council. Representation on the Council is
therefore niecessary to make the participation of the law faculty effective.
Section 2. Appointment and Term of Office.
Most judicial councils in the United States are appointed
by the Supreme iCourt or the Governor. It seems better
however that the bar who are the most affected by the work
of the judicial council should have a certain responsibility
in selecting the members. Assuming that we want the bar
to nominate members of the Council, we have a choice of having these nominations made by the entire Bar Association
or by the Executive Council. We have chosen the Executive
Council as the best body for this purpose, for the reason
that it is a small -body in which frank discussion of the
qualifications of the nominees may be had. Judicial councils appear to fail not so much because of lack of powers
as because of lack of administrative ability and interest on
the part of the men chosen. Many of the judicial councils
are mere gestures because the right men have not been appointed. Therefore it is clear that a non-political body in
which frank confidential -discussion is possible is the only
kind of a body which will ever select proper men for this
important service. We therefore thought it best to make
the Executive Council of the Bar Association the nominating body.
Nevertheless we thought it wise to give the Governor and
the Supreme Court the final voice in the selection of the
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members because of the weight which an appointment by
these officers will give to the Council. It is also doubtful
if it is constitutional to limit the appointing power to nominations made -by an unofficial body. Therefore it is not
made compulsory that the appointments be made from the
nominations submitted. These nominations probably would
be given great weight and generally followed. It does not
seem desirable to go further by making the appointment
from these nominations compulsory.
Section 3, subsection 1.
It was thought best to allow the Council to organize itself rather than to have any chairman appointed by statute.
This gives a more elastic organization.
Subsection 2. This section is somewhat rhetorical but
contains language which is usually found in these acts.
Subsection 3. It is hoped that the Judicial Council will
gradually build up in authority and influence, so that these
reports here provided will have weight. A member of the
Judicial Council of Massachusetts told us that its recommendations were at first almost completely rejected by the
Legislature but after four years of growing influence the
Council was now able to get almost everything it recommended passed.
Subsection 4. This provision is found in Oregon, Ohio,
Washington, North Carolina and North Dakota. The
Council does not now need any such power so far as any
procedural studies or changes are concerned and we have
no immdiate problem in mind which requires such power.
The idea in giving it however is that if a situation arises
where the -Council desires to investigate any practice on
the part of the bar such as ambulance chasing, it will
have the necessary machinery with which to operate. The
recent activities in Philadelphia and in New York regarding the ambulance chasing evil are in point. If such an investigation were ever required in West Virginia it would be
greatly facilitated by this section.
Section 4. This is a very important function of the Council. 'The absence of proper judicial statistics is one of the
chief causes of the failure of any judicial council. Judicial
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statistics should include a record of what happens in every
case in every nisi prius court. They are essential in order
to have any authoritative notion as to how any rule of
pleading or of substantive law is working. If this section is
passed it is hoped that the Law School may be able to start
a system of keeping judicial statistics in this state by collaborating with the Yale University Law School which is
doing it in Connecticut. When once a statistical method is
devised and proper forms provided, it should not be difficult
to have these statistics continued by the clerks.
Section 5. Rules of Pleading and Practice. This section
is discussed later.
Section 6. The incorporation of the faculty of the law
school as a research body of a judicial council is somewhat
novel. However it has been observed that judicial councils
without some machinery for research work have accomplished very little. The members cannot be expected to
give the detailed attention to such work which it requires.
Financing this work is bound to be expensive. Using the
law school therefore for this purpose seems to be the logical
solution. It will have the double advantage of getting the
work done and also bringing the faculty and students in
closer touch with the legal problems of West Virginia.
Section 7. Expenses.
As a practical matter it has been found very difficult to
obtain adequate financing from the legislature for judicial
councils. Under the scheme suggested in this act a large
part of the expenses will be shifted to the state university
by using the law faculty for research. Expenses for clerical help will not be large. The expenses for the collection
of statistics can be kept within reasonable bounds by limiting it to amounts approved by the governor.
POLICY UNDERLYING PROPOSAL TO GIVE RULEMAKING POWER TO JUDICIAL COUNCIL.
(Comment on Section 5, Rules of Pleading and Practice)
I. Rule-making power in general.
For some years the proposal to give courts complete rule
making power by which they may supersede all legislative
enactments in conflict therewith has been urged by leaders
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of the American bar. A committee of the American Bar
Association, composed of Josiah Marvel, Roscoe Pound,
Charles -S. Cutting, Frank W. Grinnell, E. W. Hinton,
Charles S. Cushing, Thomas W. Shelton and Edson R. Sunderland are endorsing this idea and conducting active propaganda in its favor.
The proposal in its broadest terms contemplates the substitution of court rules for legislative codes of practice and
procedure. For the purpose of illustration only, let us di.
vide law into two classes: (1) What the courts may do,
(2) How they may do it. The first class would include
jurisdiction and general procedure; the second, all rules of
practice directing the manner of bringing parties into court
and the method by which the court proceeds thereafter.
The first is to be a matter of legislative enactment.
The second is to be provided for by court rules.
This proposal would not eliminate codes of civil procedure, but would cut down their application to jurisdictional
matters, rules of evidence and rules of substantive law.
Nor would such a rule-making body attempt to prescribe
by general rule matters which might better be covered by
local rules of the particular court. Such matters can be
determined only by experience.
The chief practical objection urged to regulation of procedure by rules of court is that it would require the enactment of a new code of procedure which in turn would require judicial construction and would plunge us into a condition of uncertainty which it would require years to
remove.
The chief reasons for the advocacy of the rule-making
power may be summed up as follows:
(1) General rules of procedure are matters requiring
skill, experience, time and research. At present this intricate job is attempted by the legislature. Doubtless many
members of the legislature are qualified, if they only had
the time, to treat this subject adequately, but if they were
called upon to do so they could scarcely be expected to do
anything else. Every conceivable problem is placed before
them in a hurried manner in a short session. They are
necessarily embroiled in political disputes and in obtaining
a fair share of state funds for their respective counties.
Such matters must necessarily be among their first concerns
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because representation on these matters is what they are
elected for. To expect them to devote sufficient time to a
study of as intricate a matter as procedure is to expect the
impossible. It is therefore without casting any reflections
on the legislature that we say there is no conceivable object
in employing them to do a work requiring particular skill
when experts on that work are readily available.
(2) A system of procedure requires a certain elasticity.
If the rule-making power is vested in a body of experts the
rules which do not properly function may be changed without waiting for a legislative session.
(3) The making of rules of procedure should be based
upon judicial statistics. These cannot be either gathered or
understood by a legislature.
(4) The making of rules of procedure should be divorced
from political considerations. This can never be done when
they are made by legislatures. The courts and the bar
should feel a sense of responsibility towards their conduct
in the adminitration of justice. This responsibility is destroyed when they have no power to make their own rules.
(5) The rule-making power in every instance where it
has been tried has been successful. Results of successful
operation of this power are found in England, Australia,
Ireland and British India. Congress, whenever new courts
have been established, always allows these courts to establish their own procedure and this policy has met with success in the Municipal -Court of Chicago, the Court of
Claims, the United States Court of China, the Court of
Customs and Appeals, the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, the Interstate 'Commerce Commission and the
Board of Tax Appeals. The Municipal Court of Chicago is
a conspicuous example of the success of the rule-making
power.
II. 'Reasons why the initiative in rule-making power is
given to judicial council rather than to court.
In drawing this act we have preferred to give the initiative in the rule-making power to the Judicial Council rather
than the court (though the actual power is still kept in
the court) for the following reasons:
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(1) The courts do not have the time to 'work out a system of procedure.
(2) The making of rules is essentially a legislative function. Any body which makes rules must necessarily be subject to criticism which comes to all legislative bodies. This
criticism should not be borne by the courts. They should
not have to accept responsibility for the making of the rules
which they have to interpret.
The rule-making power when vested in courts has
(3)
not been a conspicuous success in America because the
courts have failed to use it. Colorado, Delaware, Washington and Michigan have all granted complete power to courts
to make rules which may supersede any act of the legislature. Nothing has been done under this power as yet by
the Courts themselves. Much is being accomplished at
present in these states, but the work is being done by committees of the Bar Association who are submitting rules to
courts. In this act we have attempted to supply the judicial council with the necessary research machinery through
the use of the Law School Faculty so that the rule-making
power may be effective.
We have not however deprived the courts of their power
over these rules. The Supreme Court has been given an absolute right to refuse to put into effect any new rule of
which it does not approve. The initial burden of making
the rules is all that has been transferred to the Council and
we believe that is the body on which this burden should rest.

THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ACT.

The only constitutional question that can arise with respect to this act relates to the rule-making power. The
Judicial Council may propose rules governing pleading and
practice which become effective upon an order of the Supreme Court -of Appeals. Although there are no exact
precedents supporting the constitutionality of this provision, we believe that there will be no difficulty in upholding it upon general well established principles. We shall
attempt to present the analysis and argument on this point
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as briefly as possible. A list of authorities follows the discussion.
The question involves constitutional doctrines as to the
separation and delegation of governmental power. Our
Constitution (Art. 5, Sec. 1) provides:
"The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct so that neither
shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either
of the others, nor shall any person exercise the
powers of more than one at the same time excepting
that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the
legislature."
The decision of any particular case arising under this
broad general section of the Constitution must turn upon
the view taken as to the nature of the power to be exercised.
It is difficult to lay down any logical scheme for allocating
powers of various kinds to the different governmental departments. There are no hard and fast categories. Historical and practical considerations must be taken into account.
The nature of the rule-making power has been discussed
in a number of judicial opinions and articles. There are
two views: (1) that this power is an exclusively judicial
power and (2) that it is a legislative power, although not
exclusively such. There is no authority for the view that
it is an exclusive non-delegable power of the legislature.
That possibility may therefore be at once dismissed.
I.
If the power is exclusively judicial that would mean that
the only reason that statutory provisions governing practice
and procedure have ever had any force has been that the
judiciary has tacitly accepted the legislative rule. Any
rule made by the court in conflict with a statute would take
precedence. This is the view presented by Dean Wigmore in
23 Ill. L. Rev. 276. There is a suggestion of this view in several North Carolina cases, but the principal reason for these
cases holding that a rule of the Supreme Court would take
precedence over a legislative act is to be found in the
peculiar provisions of the North Carolina constitution.
Other cases suggesting the idea that the rule-making power
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is inherently judicial and may not be exercised by the legislature are probably to be explained on the ground that the
legislative enactments involved related not simply to practice and procedure but attempted to prescribe how the
members of the court should act under given circumstances.
An example of the latter -are statutes requiring opinions in
all cases to be in writing. There is little substantial authority in support of the view that the rule-making power
is exclusively judicial. It does not make a ready appeal to
judges or members of the bar who are accustomed to the
idea of following statutory regulations of practice and
procedure.
Under this view, however, no constitutional question of
the validity of the statute we are suggesting would arise.
In making an order putting into effect the rules proposed
by the Judicial Council the court itself is exercising a rulemaking power. It is true that under our plan the court is
not given the power to initiate proposals. If the Supreme
Court should undertake to make rules on its own initiative
in conflict with those previously proposed by the Judicial
Council and made effective by court order, then the ques.tion whether the judiciary possesses inherent and exclusive
rule-making power would arise. That, however, is no more
apt to come up than the question whether under the present
statutory situation a rule of court would take precedence
over a statute on matters of practice and procedure.
II.
The view that the power may be exercised by the legislature but that it is not an exclusive legislative power is
widely held. The leading case is State ex rel Foster-Wyman
Luntber Co. v. Superior Court, 267 Pac. 770 (Wash., 1928).
This case upholds a rule made by the court under a statute giving the court such powers, even though it conflicted
with an earlier statute. Dean Pound and Mr. Scott of the
Harvard Law School have also expressed this view of the
nature of the rule-making power in articles appearing
in the list of authorities. When our constitutions were
adopted, the practice in the English courts was regulated
by the superior courts at Westminster, which correspond
to our state supreme courts. There is thus historical pre-
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cedent for this view that courts may exercise rule-making
power. Our own court has held that the power is not exclusively in the legislature in that the court has the inherent power to make rules not in conflict with any existing
statutory provision. Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454
(1920). There would seem to be no question that the
power is one which may be delegated to the court.
The provisions of the statute we are suggesting, however,
are slightly different in that they do not give the court
complete -power of making rules. The Judicial Council has
the power of initiating proposals and the court is limited
to approving and putting into effect the proposals thus
made. Although this procedure varies but little from -that
provided by the Washington statute, it presents a problem
that is new in some respects.
There can be no question that the legislature itself might
propose rules leaving the court to accept them or not as
it should choose. If the court may be given complete
power of rule-making it would seem to be a far less delegation of power to permit it merely to accept or reject a
proposal already framed. -The only question then is
whether the power of proposing the rules may be delegated
by the Legislature to the Judicial 'Council.
Many decisions in state and federal courts upholding the
powers delegated to public service commissions, workmen's
compensation boards, boards of health, etc., lend much support to the constitutionality of such a delegation of power.
It is repeatedly stated in the cases that the legislature
may lay down a policy and delegate the carrying out of
this policy and the making and enforcing of detailed rules.
This is precisely the type of thing that the Judicial Council
would be doing in proposing rules for practice and procedure. If the legislature may delegate power to make and
put into effect detailed regulations in the fields referred to,
it would seem to follow that it might delegate the power of
merely proposing rules to the Council.
It is indeed quite arguable under the decisions mentioned
that the complete rule-making power might be given to the
Judicial Council alone, without a provision for court approval. But there is one feature of the rule-making power
which might serve to distinguish it from other powers that
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have been delegated. The Judicial Council is undoubtedly
an agency in the executive branch of the government. It
might be considered an improper division of authority to
permit it to prescribe rules according to which the judicial
branch should carry on its work. This objection however
does not appear under our proposed act. The Judicial Council has not been given the power to control the work of the
courts. No rule can go into effect without an order of the
Supreme Court of Appeals which is properly the head of
the judicial system of the state. There can thus be no encroachment by the executive on the functions of the judicial
department. This being true it is difficult to see any objections from the standpoint of constitutionality. It is
merely the power of proposing rules that is delegated.
Since the power of rule-making is not an exclusively legislative function there can be no objection to such delegation.
Practical considerations lend further support to this
argument. Chief Justice Taft has frankly recognized that
the question of the separation and delegation of powers involves considerations of "common sense and the inherent
necessities of the governmental co-ordination" J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Go. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928).
We have already shown that it is eminently proper that a
body like the Judicial Council should investigate all questions of procedure and make recommendations for rules
governing practice and procedure. It is also a wise provision to permit the judiciary to have the final word as to
what rules should actually go into effect. There is no encroachment by any department of government upon any
other department. The entire scheme would seem to be in
accord with "common sense and the inherent necessities of
the governmental co-ordination".
REVIEW OF AUTHORITIES FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RULE MAKING POWER.
The view that power to make rules for pleading and
practice is an inherent judicial power and that all statutes
prescribing such rules are unconstitutional, has occasionally
been urged. (John H. Wigmore, Editorial Note, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure ard Void Constitutionally, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276.)

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC.

In several North Carolina cases it has been held that a
rule of the Supreme Court takes precedence over a statute
governing appellate practice. Herondon v. Insurance Company, 111 N. C. 384 (1892) ; Greene v. Newsome, 184 N. C.
615 (1922) ; Lee v. Baird, 146 N. C. 363 (1907) ; Pentruff v.
Park, 195 N. C. 609 (1928) and cases there cited. The constitution of North Carolina, however, provides (Art. IV,
Sec. 2) that the Legislature should regulate procedure in all
courts below the Supreme Court, leaving it to be -implied
that the Supreme Court should make rules regulating the
procedure on appeal. These cases therefore do not support
the general view of inherent judicial power, but turn on the
peculiar provisions of the State Constitution.
Many judicial opinions referring to the inherent rule
making power of the courts have been rendered in cases
involving statutes which prescribe the details of judicial
conduct and may thus be considered as encroaching on the
judicial branch of the government. In re Jessup, 81 Cal.
487 (1889) (a statute requiring orders for a re-hearing to
be made in writing signed by five justices); Houston v.
Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859) (a statute requiring that opinions in all cases be in writing) ; ex parte, Grffiths, 118 Ind.
83 (1888) (a statute requiring a judge to write the syllabus in cases to be reported). Such statutes may sometimes
be difficult to distinguish from those governing pleading
and practice, but it is believed that it is possible to do so.
Such a distinction is pointed out in Parkinson v. Thompsan
164 Ind. 609 (1905).
Although it cannot be said to be a question that has been
finally determined, it seems clear that the rule making
power is not exclusively judicial.
The view that the Legislature has power to prescribe
rules for pleading and practice but that such power might
be delegated to the court, finds much judicial support. In
State ex rel Foster-Wyman. Lumber Co. v. Superior Court
for King County, 267 Pac. 770 (Wash. 1928) it was held
that a statute was constitutional which provided that the
Supreme Court might make rules for the superior courts
which would supersede prior statutes. The -court said (p.
773) :
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"The Legislature, although formerly functioning in
this state as the source of rules of practice and procedure in the courts, did not, in so doing, perform an
act exclusively legislative, and may, if it so desires
transfer that power to the court without such act being a delegation of legislative power."
A similar statute was upheld in Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo.
132 (1923). The Supreme Court of the United States expressed the same view in Weyman v. Southard, 10 Wheat,
1 (1825) and Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10
Wheat 51 (1825). The delegation of such power by the
Legislature to a court is also discussed and the historical
background given in articles in legal periodicals. Roscoe
Pound, Regulation of Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 Ill.
L. Rev. 163; Austin W. Scott, Actions at Law in the Federal Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Edmond M. Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 Minn L. Rev. 81.
If the Legislature could delegate the power to make rules,
it would follow that it might also frame rules, leaving it
to the court to put them into effect. Authorities holding
that an act may be proposed in complete form with the provision that it should become effective upon an act of a public officer are collected in 12 C. J. 864. See Blue v. Smit,
69 W. Va. 761 (1911).
The delegation by the Legislature to the Judicial Council of the power to frame rules which should go into effect
upon order of the Court, finds support in many decisions
holding that the Legislature may delegate to administrative bodies the power to enact rules and regulations to
carry out a broad policy laid down by the Legislature in
connection with the subject. West Virginia cases enunciating this principle are United Fuel Gas Company vs. Publio Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571 (1914) ; State eco rel.
Public Service Commission vs. B. & 0. R. 1R. Co., 76 W. Va.
399 (1915). A large number of cases to the same effect are
collected in 12 C. J. 847-853.
In Blue v. Smith, cited supra, a statute authorized the
Chief Inspector over Public Offices to prescribe rules and
forms to be followed in keeping the accounts of public
funds of the state. These were to become operative upon
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the approval of the Board of Public Works. This statute
was held to be constitutional. The mechanics of the statutory scheme are not unlike those of the suggested statute
on rule-making power.
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II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
DURE.

PROCE-

THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT PROCEDURE.
Two difficulties immediately occur to the experienced
lawyer who reads the draft of a proposal changing procedure in actions at law. First, that any radical change in
procedure leads to confusion. Second, that any new system of procedure is at first considered as an experiment
and by many as a dangerous experiment. As a matter of
fact both of these difficulties generally turn out to be more
imaginary than real. Procedure generally works better
when it is new than when it is old, or at least it is under
systems which have been in effect for a long time, that the
most evident abuses have arisen. In England the efforts
of the most respectable members of the bar were united to
prevent the imposition of a system which they sincerely
felt would bring chaos. Their predictions remain unfulfilled and the English system is regarded as a model. The
confusion relating to changing systems of legal procedure
and the danger of adopting new ones has never in the past
at least led to any of the disaastrous results which were
predicted. Nevertheless we recognize that these two ideas
are entertained by very intelligent and eminent lawyers and
we have met them in the following way.
(1) We have not undertaken to change the present common law procedure in West Virginia in any particular. If
our suggestions were adopted tomorrow any lawyer could
still use any of the procedural forms to which he has been
accustomed.
(2) We have adopted as a basis for our suggestions the
extension of a form of procedure which is already in use
in a restricted form in West Virginia so that everyone is
familiar with its operation. Its use has been an unqualified
success. It has been in use for over ten years in Virginia
with the result that lawyers have so far preferred it that
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common law actions are practically abolished not by statutory action but by the deliberate preference of an experienced bay. An actual count of the cases shows that
less procedural difficulties have arisen under this system
than under the old common law pleading in spite of the
fact that the motion procedure has been construed but a
very short time. The reason of course is that it has not
needed much construction.
Therefore in answer to those who say that it is dangerous to change the procedure we may reply -that we have
changed nothing-that if our suggestions are not inherently valuable they will fall into disuse because no one is
compelled to take advantage of them. The bar is risking
nothing if it accepts our suggestions because -they are entirely optional.
To those who urge that our suggestions constitute a dangerous experiment we may also reply that they are neither
an experiment nor have they proved to be dangerous. On
the contrary they have worked and worked well with a
minimum of judicial construction and to the entire satisfaction of those who are using them.
The idea of offering these optional changes in procedure
which would come in general use only if they were effective
was suggested to us by Mr. David C. Howard of the
Charleston bar. We feel that it is the only possible way
in which procedural changes will ever be actually accomplished because it combines the possibility of a new system
together with an escape from that system if it proves to be
unsatisfactory.
At the risk of being tedious we feel that it is necessary to
explain somewhat in detail the atmosphere and psychology
with which we have attempted to invest this suggested
method of pleading. We do this because we feel that the
success of any system of pleading depends as much on the
attitude with which it is regarded by the bench and bar as
on its actual content. Codes of pleading are like constitutions. The actual rules which they lay down are not as important as the frame of mind of their interpreters. In
drawing up this act we have tried to take the emphasis
away from the pleading and transfer it to the trial of the
case. The only way to make pleading simple is to
make questions of pleading comparative unimportant.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss1/3

28

Arnold et al.: Report to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Refo
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

If the emphasis is put upon pleading, and a logical system of rules is developed, the questions which arise under that system will be endless. If the parties are told to
give each other reasonable notice of what their case is
about, and then go ahead and try it, questions of pleading
will not arise-provided always that the judge or umpire is
given sufficient power to compel the parties on his own motion to make the case reasonably clear. On the other hand
if the parties are told that if they follow certain rules and
their logical implications, and -then if they have done this
satisfactorily they may have a trial, rules will have to be
added to rules and interpretations to interpretations forever. The attempt to provide in advance for all contingencies represents one attitude which we have tried to
avoid. The alternative has been to increase the power of
the judge to control the way that the case is finally presented for trial, giving him power to call the parties before
him and tell them to straighten their pleadings out. In
order to do this we have made our procedure as short as
possible, and left everything to the fairness and good sense
of the trial judge which could properly be placed in his
hands. No other official in our government has had his
hands so tied by rules and restrictions as our judges. One
aim of our proposal is to free the judges so far as is possible from these restrictions, and t& allow them a free hand in
bringing to bear, in the conduct of their business, their experience and judgment.
The motion for judgment procedure, as it has worked out
in West Virginia in a limited class of actions, and in Virginia in all actions at law, places the responsibility on the
judge by limiting the pleading to a statement of the bare essentials, necessary to go to trial. These essentials are (1)
the defendant must know in a general way what he is being
sued for (2) the plaintiff must know in a general way what
kind of a defense he will have to meet. If we have this
condition, further pleading is superfluous except as a
matter of logical symmetry, and logical symmetry can
never be achieved without emphasizing it until the purpose
of the court to decide the rights of litigants is lost in the
background. The great merit of common law pleading over
the pleading of facts is that by its artificial forms it provides a method of informing the other party as to what the
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case is about in a general way without detail. Its only
defect is that it has been raised to the impo-tance of a logical creed, and its logical consistency has in many instances
been regarded as of more importance than the substantive
rights of litigants.
Granting that all we need to start the trial of a case is
that each party should know in a general way what the
other party's case or defense is about, how shall we assure
ourselves of that result before the trial of each case? The
sensible answer is that each shall tell the other as briefly as
possible what he is trying to do, without detail. Generally this is all that is required. If one of the parties is not
satisfied with the information which he has received, he
may ask for more. The judge is in a better position than
anyone else to know whether this inquiry is made in good
faith, or only for the purpose of securing a technical advantage. If the parties themselves are satisfied, but the
judge does not think that enough advance information is.
given, then he can tell the parties just what more he wants.
That is exactly what the judges are doing in Virginia under this form of procedure. It sounds sensible, and we
believe that the overwhelming opinion of lawyers and
judges in its favor is conclusive evidence that it is as sensible as it sounds.
If any other general attitude is taken toward pleading, or
if greater emphasis is put on it than is required to fulfill
these two essentials, it becomes a complicated ritual sooner
or later. The great success of the English system, which is
regarded almost with awe by the leaders of procedural reform in this country, owes its efficiency, according to Mr.
Sunderland, not to the numerous rules, which are not so
simple as one might imagine, but to a process which compels the parties to come before a master and informally settle how the case is to be presented. There are as many opportunities for complicated construction under the English Rules as under any other system. But these questions
are almost impossible to raise. The master informally
tells the parties to get ready for trial and tell him and each
other what the case is about. They submit to him the
method they are going to follow. If he doesn't like it he
suggests changes. In such an atmosphere it is extremely
difficult to be technical When the case goes to trial there
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are no questions of pleading, and before the case goes to
trial the directions of the master prevent arguments on
pleading.
In addition to that the pleaders are aided by numerous
forms, with which all parties are familiar. These forms
are only suggestions, but they are generally used.
We have tried to do the same things in our proposed motion procedure. We have not tried to do them exactly the
same way as has been done in England because of the difficulty of adopting an entirely new system. When we have
a model procedure with which everyone is familiar, and the
success of which has been proved, it seems futile to use unfamiliar methods, however sound they may be. We believe
that the motion for judgment procedure is just as well
adapted to accomplishing these results as any we have
found. And it has the advantage of being susceptible of
examination in its actual practice in Virginia. Our forms
we have taken largely from Connecticut. Many of the details of our procedure are taken from the English practice,
but its general framework and sequence is made to conform
to what is already familiar to the West Virginia bench and
bar.
Objection is often raised that this procedure will not
work in 'tort actions. Why not? If any kind of an action
lends itself to short informal statement a tort action does.
Every attempt to define the issues clearly in a tort action
has always failed. The plaintiff says that the defendant
negligently injured him. The defendant claims that it was
the plaintiff's fault. This is about all that the pleadings
ever show in any action of that kind regardless of all attempts to force them to show more. The best answer to the
objection this form of procedure cannot be used in tort actions is the fact that in Virginia experienced lawyers use it
in the most important tort cases in preference to common
law pleading. Suppose an action for libel and slander, one
of the most technical declarations to draw. If it were
pleaded under the motion practice the notice would run as
follows:
"To C------ D
,----W ------ , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----- day of---------1929, I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court
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of ----------- County, West Virginia, at the court house
in --------- at the opening of court or as soon thereafter
as the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment
against you for damages in the sum of $----Said
damages were suffered because that during October, 1929, in
the City of Morgantown, West Virginia, in the hearing of
other persons you spoke to and concerning me the following words, which from their usual construction and common
acceptance are construed as insults and tend to violence
and breach of the peace, to-wit:
'You are dishonest in your dealings.'
'You ought to be arrested.'
'You are a confidence man.)
Dated this ---- day of ------------ 1929.
A --------- B ....
By ----------His Attorney."
Suppose again an action for damages for negligence.
Under the motion practice the notice would ran as follows:
"To the --------- Company, a corporation, -------West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney, before the circuit court of
------ County, West Virginia, at the court house in
-at
the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can -be heard, and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of -----This sum is due me from
you for damages suffered by me when struck by a bus
negligently operated by your agent on ----------- Street
near ----------- Street in the City of Morgantown, West
Virginia, on or about the ----day of -------- , 1929. At
which time and place you may appear if you see fit.
Dated this -- day of ---------- , 1929.
A - - - ---------B -------- , Plaintiff.
By--------- , His Attorney."
We ask in all candor what more is gained by a long extended statement of facts such as is found in code pleading or formality such as is found in common law pleading.
The plaintiff if he has good sense will not disclose his evidence but will simply obscure it in a mass of words. The
defendant under any system of pleading will know nothing
more than can be inferred from these statements, and in
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addition to that, in a tort action both parties know all about
the case anyway.
The objection has also been raised that this form of procedure will not make definite issues for trial. The notion
that this can be done in any system of pleading is responsible for most of the intricate complexities which vex us today. The attempt to create definite issues has been made
in two ways.
(1) The common law way. Historically the common
law system tried to keep its issues definite and clear by refusing justice to everyone who demanded any kind of relief which did not fit into its narrow form of writs. If no
writ could be found to fit the action, then no relief could
be given. The failure of this system is evidenced by the
fact that another system had to be imposed on it to meet
the demands of justice, a circumstance which has 'happened
in no other system of jurisprudence., The other device of
the common law system of pleading in its attempt to make
issues definite and clear was more successful because it
evaded the issue, and gave up the attempt under the cloak
of a fiction. This device was simply to pretend there was a
clear cut issue by compelling the parties to allege and deny
matters which had nothing to do with the case and never
happened. Logical symmetry was preserved at the expense
of reality, but at least lawyers escaped the bother of trying
their cases twice,--once in the pleadings and again at the
trial, through the convenient subterfuge of a fictitious
form. Suppose that the plaintiff uses the common counts
and the defendant pleads the general issue. Such pleading
does not create any clear cut issue; it actually conceals any
issue which might be in the case and conceals it very elaborately. Yet even this absurd ritual seems to work fairly
well, for the simple reason that in nine cases out of ten the
defendant actually knows what he is being sued for and the
plaintiff knows what kind of a defense he will have to meet.
By using these forms the parties escape pleading difficulties,
not because the issues are clear, but because there is nothing
left to do but to try the case. Once try to make the issues
clear, and one good technical lawyer can run the pleadings
out indefinitely and create enough controversies to keep
appellate courts busy for years. And this because we have
lost sight of the fact that a case should only be tried once,
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(2) The second way of making clear cut issues is usually termed Code pleading, a somewhat inaccurate term because there are so many kinds of codes. However it is
usually applied to the attempt to make the parties plead
the facts and come to definite issues on the facts. This
use is due to the fact that this was the attempt made in the
first New York Code. This code, though much criticised
was copied in most of the western states because they had
to have some model and it was the only one available. In
our opinion fact pleading has resulted in more delays and
technicalities than common law pleading because of its attempt to define the issues 'before the trial. Once the attempt is made there is no limit to the possibilities of motions to strike, and motions to make more definite and certain. In tke case of the general issue pleaded to the common counts the parties had to go to trial because there was
nothing else to do. in the case of fact pleading, the parties
never have to go to trial, became there is always something
else to do. ]Hence the failure of the attempt to define the
issues by pleading the facts.
Of course we must readily admit that any system of pleading develops according to its atmosphere and psychology
rather than according to the language of its rules. Under
the common law system in West 'Virginia it is entirely possible to draw up a declaration in the same way that a petition is drawn in a code state, and for the defendant to draw
the same kind of an answer. This is never done. The atmosphere and attitude of the pleader is different and also
the attitude of the judge construing the pleading does not
lean that way. So too we admit that it is possible under
our motion system to plead facts elaborately. However
that has never been done in Virginia or West Virginia because the emphasis has not been put on elaborate pleading
of facts and such pleadings are not favorably regarded.
The motion system of pleading has worked so well in West
Virginia in its limited form and in Virginia in all actions
for the followng reasons: (1) It has avoided on the one
hand the attempt to secure a fictitious logical symmetry
which is the fault of the common law pleading, and (2) it
has avoided the attempt to clarify issues of fact which is
the impossible dream of the code pleader.
We may summarize the changes which we have made in
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the Virginia system by the statement that to this Virginia
system we have added two other essentials. We believe
that they are essential because we have discovered in conference with Virginia attorneys and judges that the Virginia courts are following our changes as a matter of practice without statutory authority. These additions are (1)
we have put the power to control the pleadings where it
belongs-in the court. This is actually what the Virginia
judges are doing today in their motion procedure. It is
the reason why English procedure works so well. It is
fundamentally the reason why football games, in spite of a
volume of complicated rules, can nevertheless be played
without several days preliminary adjudication. The contesting teams must trust the umpire instead of the rules.
The emphasis is on getting the game played.
(2) We have offered a number of forms for guides which
are not compulsory but which may be followed. The tendency is always to follow forms. It is safer. The existence
of certain forms is really what has kept common law
pleading on its feet. These forms which we have offered
are adapted from Connecticut forms which have worked
successfully in an industrial state with complicated litigation and crowded courts. We believe that they tell the
defendant in a general wiy what he should know of the
plaintiff's case.
We think we have achieved in this motion procedure the
atmosphere of common la* pleading because it is an attempt
not to give the details of the case but rather a system of
notice pleading which is the heart of the common law system. If we were forced to select a name for it we would
like to call it "simplified common law pleading".
We believe that we may recommend its adoption for the
following reasons: (1) Because it is not unfamiliar to
West Virginia lawyers. (2) Because it preserves the atmosphere of common law pleading through its reliance on
notice to the opposite party rather than on the details of
the case. (3) Because it has been entirely successful in
Virginia not by a compulsory legislative fiat but by the
voluntary acceptance of an experienced bar. (4) Because
it does not take away from any lawyer the right to use the
common law pleading if he prefers it.
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DRAFT OF ACT AMENDING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT PROCEDURE.
Note :-The proposal is made on the assumption that the
proposed revised code will be passed. If it is not, the
changes in section references can readily be made.
CHAPTER 56.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
ARTICLE 2.
NOTICES OF MOTIONS.

Sections 1-5 as in the draft of the Revised Code without
change.
Section 6. Motion for Judgment; Discontinuance. Any
person entitled to maintain an action at law may,' in lieu
of such action at law, proceed by motion for judgment before any court which would have jurisdiction in such action, after not less than twenty days' notice, which notice
shall be in writing, signed by the plaintiff or his attorneys,
and shall be returned to the clerk's office of such court
within five days after service of the same, and when so returned shall be forthwith filed and the date of filing noted
thereon, and shall be placed upon the docket for hearing.
Such notice may be served, returned, filed and docketed at
any time before or during the term of court at which the
motion for judgment is to be made, and may be heard at
such term if the term continues for a period of twenty days
after the service of such notice. If the court be not in
session on the return day as set out in the notice, and the
term of court be not ended, the motion shall be considered
continued until the next court day of the term, and if the
term be ended, then the motion shall stand continued.
The return day of a notice under this section shall not be
more than ninety days from its date unless the commencement of the next succeeding term of court be more than
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ninety days from such date, in which case the return day
may be the first day of such term.
A proceeding under this section shall not be discontinued
by reason of the failure of the clerk to docket the same or
by reason of no order of continuance being entered in it
from one day to another or from term to term.
All pleadings and motions under this and the following
sections shall be as simple and non-technical as may be consistent with the efficient administration of justice.
Pleadings under this and the following section may be
filed in the clerk's office as of course without order of court,
and the clerk shall endorse thereon the date of filing and
upon request, the time of filing.
,Section 7. Joinder of Claims and Parties; Counterclaims. To the end that all matters at law in controversy
between the parties to any dispute shall be completely and
finally determined in one proceeding and multiplicity of
legal proceedings avoided, the trial court in its discretion
may permit matters involving several claims, counterclaims or parties, plaintiff or defendant, to be tried together
if it can be conveniently done, subject to the following provisions:
In any proceeding by motion for judgment, the plaintiff
may unite in the same proceeding, any number of claims
regardless of their nature. All persons may be joined in
one proceeding as plaintiffs either jointly, severally or in
the alternative, in any case where, if such persons brought
separate actions any common question of fact or law of substantial importance would arise, and all persons may be
joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief
is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative. The court may in its discretion permit the defendant on motion, to join other parties to the proceeding,
either as plaintiff or co-defendant. Judgment may be given
against such one or more of the defendants as may be
found to be liable according to their respective liabilities.
The defendant or defendants may set up by way of counterclaim, any claim against any plaintiff, upon which he might
bring an action at law before the same court;
Provided however, that such claims as cannot conveniently be disposed of or tried together or such counterclaims as
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cannot be conveniently tried together with the claims of the
plaintiff may on motion of any party or on the court's own
motion, be ordered to be severed or stayed or any of the issues may be ordered to be separately tried; and
Provided further, that if it. shall appear that the joinder
of any plaintiff or defendant may embarrass or delay the
trial of the action, the court may order separate trials or
make such other order as may -be expedient; and
Provided further, that if the joinder of any claims,
counterclaims or parties is likely to create a substantial
prejudice in favor of, or against any one of the parties because of the nature of the evidence which is likely to be
introduced, the Court may, in its discretion, order separate
trials even though said issues might otherwise conveniently
be tried together.
OR (Alternative Section)
Section 7. Joinder of Claims; Counterclaims. In a proceeding under the preceding section, the plaintiff may
unite in the same proceeding any number of claims between
the same parties regardless of their nature. If such claims
cannot conveniently be disposed of or tried together, the
court may at any time, on motion of a party or on its own
motion, order any of them to be severed or stayed, or order
any of the issues to be separately tried.
The defendant may set up by way of counterclaim any
claim against the plaintiff upon which he might bring an
action at law before the same court. If any such counterclaim cannot conveniently be disposed of or tried together
with the claims of the plaintiff or if the nature of such
counterclaim is such as to create a prejudice againsD the
plaintiff, the court may at any time, on motion of a party
or on its own motion, order that the counterclaim be proceeded with separately in an independent action, or order
the issues arising on the counterclaim to be separately tried.
Section 8. Affidavit of Claim; Judgment. In any such
proceeding by motion to recover money on contract, if the
plaintiff shall serve and file with his notice an affidavit of
himself or any other credible person, stating the several
items of the plaintiff's claim, and the sum affiant believes
is due from the defendant to the plaintiff thereon, including
principal and interest, after deducting all payments, credits
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and sets-off, no notice of defense setting forth a defense on
the merits shall be filed in the case unless the defendant
shall file therewith the affidavit of himself or of some other
credible person, stating that the afflant believes that there
is not any sum due from the defendant to the plaintiff upon
the demand or demands stated in the plaintiff's notice, or
stating a sum certain less than that stated in the affidavit
filed by the plaintiff, which the affiant believes is all that is
due to the plaintiff. If such notice of defense and affidavit
be not filed, on motion, judgment shall be entered for the
plaintiff for the sum stated in his affidavit with interest
thereon from the date thereof until paid. If the notice of
defense and the affidavit filed by defendant admits that any
sum is due to the plaintiff, judgment may be taken for the
sum so admitted to be due, with interest thereon from the
date of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff until paid, and the
case tried as to the residue.
If the plaintiff does not file such affidavit with his notice
of motion and the defendant does not appear, judgment
shall be entered for the plaintiff as hereinbefore provided
upon the subsequent filing of such affidavit by the plaintiff.
Section 9. Notice of Defense; Further Pleading. The
defendant may state his grounds of defense, and/or his
counterclaims, informally in a notice of defense, and there
shall be no other pleading by the defendant. As to new
matter in the notice of defense constituting a defense to the
claim set forth in the notice of motion, the parties shall be
deemed to be at issue on the grounds stated without further
pleading; Provided, however, that the court, on motion of a
party or on its own motion, may order such further or
amended pleadings to be filed as the nature of the case may
require.
Every allegation of fact in any pleading not denied in
the next subsequent pleading of the adverse party where
such subsequent pleading is required, shall be taken as admitted; except that allegations in the notice of defense not
bearing upon a counterclaim shall not be taken as admitted
if the plaintiff fails to deny such allegations in his notice
of defense to counterclaim.
Matter entitling the defendant to relief in equity which
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he would be entitled to plead under section five, article five
of this chapter, may be set forth in the notice of defense.
Section 10. Notice of Defense to Counterclaim. If the
defendant in his statement of defense states a counterclaim,
the plaintiff may state his grounds of defense to the counterclaim informally in a notice of defense to counterclaim, under the same provisions as the defendant may defend as to
the notice of motion.
,Section 11. Verification of Pleadings. Where any party
sets forth matter in a pleading, which contains the substance of a plea required to be verified when pleaded in an
action at law, he shall verify the pleading in its entirety, or
shall file an affidavit of himself or some other credible person covering the matter containing the substance of the
plea required to be verified.
'Section 12. Objection to .Pleading. An objection to a
pleading or any part thereof in point of law for a ground
appearing on the face of the pleading, may be taken by a
motion to quash. A demurrer shall be treated as a motion
to quash for an objection appearing on the face of the
pleading. Said motion to quash when made to a notice
of motion, shall be made before or at the time of the filing
of the notice of defense and when made to the notice of defense shall be made within twenty days after the filing
thereof. Where there is an objection to a pleading on the
ground that it fails to inform the opposing party sufficiently of the nature and object of the claim, defense or counterclaim, or that its precise meaning is otherwise indefinite,
uncertain or obscure, the objection may be taken by a motion to require the amendment of the pleading.
If an objection is not taken by motion within the time
specified, it shall be waived unless it shall be upon either
of the following gTounds:
1. That the pleading is insufficient in that it fails to
state the substance of a claim or defense and that such insufficiency has actually misled or is likely to mislead the
adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits.
2. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the proceeding.
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OR (Alternative Section)
Section 12. Objection to Pleading. An objection to any
pleading or any part thereof in point of law for a
ground appearing on the face of the pleading may be taken
by a motion to quash. Where there is an objection to a
pleading on the ground that it fails to inform the opposing
party sufficiently of the nature and object of the claim, defense or counterclaim, or that its precise meaning is otherwise indefinite, uncertain or obscure, the objection may be
taken by a motion to require the amendment of the pleading. A demurrer shall be treated as a motion to quash for
an objection appearing on the face of the pleading,
iSection 13. Summary Disposition of Certain Defenses.
If the defendant believes that a trial of the action may be
avoided by a summary presentation of any of the following
defenses:
(1) That the proceeding has not been brought before
the proper court;
(2) That the court has not jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant;
(3) That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the proceeding;
(4) That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue;
(5) That there is another action or proceeding either at
law or in equity pending between the same parties for the
same cause;
(6) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment;
(7) That the cause of action did not accrue within the
time limited -by law for the commencement of an action
thereon;
(8) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been released;
(9) That the claim on which the proceeding is founded
is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds;
(10) That the cause of action did not accrue against
defendant because of his infancy or other disability;
(11) That the plaintiff's claim has been discharged in
bankruptcy;
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he may present the same by a motion to quash the notice
of motion for judgment or any claim set forth therein, supported by affidavits to be filed setting forth the facts relied
upon. If the plaintiff desires to file counter-affidavits the
court shall fix a time within which such counter-affidavits
may be filed. The court may decide the motion on the affidavits presented, and if the motion is granted, the court
may in its discretion permit the plaintiff to amend his notice of motion upon such terms as are just. If such motion
raises an issue of fact not determinable on the affidavits,
the court may in its discretion, deny the motion with leave
to the defendant to set forth the matters relied upon, in his
notice of defense, or may forthwith hear evidence presented
by the respective parties. Where evidence is to be heard
on such an issue of fact, on demand of either party, a jury
shall be impanelled to hear such evidence.
The plaintiff may move to quash a counterclaim under
the same provisions as the defendant may move with respect
to the notice of motion.
Section 14. Matters in Abatement. Matters in abatement not presented by motion under section thirteen of this
article may be set forth in the notice of defense but may not
be presented by amendment or otherwise after any defense
on the merits has been filed.
Section 15. TrialL On motion when an issue of fact is
joined and either party desires it, a jury shall be impanelled for the trial of the issue. Otherwise the trial shall be
before the court without a jury.
If the issue of fact arises on a matter in abatement, the
court may in its discretion, try such issue first.
If the issue of fact arises on an equitable defense where a
trial by jury is not required by the Constitution, such issue
may be tried by the court without a jury.
Section 16. Variance. INo variance between the allegations in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material
or shall be a ground for reversal of a ruling of the trial
court unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his
prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. Wherever it appears that a party has been so mis-
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led the court may order the pleading to be amended, upon
such terms as may be just.
Where the variance is not material as defined above, the
trial court or the appellate court, may disregard it, or before or after judgment order an immediate amendment of
the pleadings to conform to the proof, without costs.
'Section 17. Summary Judgments in Certain Cases. In
a proceeding under the preceding sections to recover a debt
or liquidated demand in money, with or without interest,
arising:
(1) On a negotiable instrument, a contract under seal
or a recognizance; or
(2) Any other contract, express or implied excepting
quasi-contracts; or
(3) On a judgment for a stated sum; or
(4) On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered
is a fixed sum or in the nature of a debt; or
(5) On a guaranty, whether under seal or not, when the
claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only;
the plaintiff may, at any time after the defendant appears
and before trial, move for immediate judgment on all or
part of the claim set forth in the notice of motion, by giving at least ten days' written notice to the defendant or his
attorney, and serving and filing with the notice of said motion an affidavit of himself or any other credible person,
stating that, to the affiant's personal knowledge, the allegations contained in the notice of motion, with respect to
the claim on which judgment is sought, are true, and that
the affiant believes there is no defense to such claim.
Where such motion is made by the plaintiff, the defendant
may file an affidavit of himself or other credible person
stating on personal knowledge, the facts relied upon as a
defense to the plaintiff's claim; or the affidavit may admit
part of the plaintiff's claim and state, on personal knowledge, the facts relied upon as a defense to the residue. If
no affidavit is filed by the defendant or if the affidavit filed
does not show such facts as may be deemed by the court to
entitle the defendant to defend, judgment shall be entered
for the plaintiff on the claim stated in the plaintiff's affidavit. If an affidavit be filed by the defendant and part of
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the plaintiff's claim shall be admitted, and if such affidavit
shows such facts as may be deemed by the court to entitle
the defendant to defend as to the residue, judgment may be
taken by the plaintiff on the claim admitted. In any case
where the plaintiff recovers judgment on only part of his
claim the case shall be tried as to the residue.
The defendant may move for immediate judgment on a
counterclaim under the same provisions as a plaintiff may
move for immediate judgment on any claim set forth in the
notice of motion.
Section 18. Commencement of Proceeding. A proceeding under the preceding sections shall commence when the
notice of motion is returned to and filed with the clerk;
Provided, however, that the plaintiff may commence the
proceeding prior to the service of the notice of motion by
filing a true copy of the notice with the clerk, the date of
which notice must be the date of the filing of the said copy,
or an earlier date. In the event that the plaintiff exercises
this option and the notice of motion is returned by the
sheriff of the proper county "not found" as to any defendant
the plaintiff may serve on the defendant an alias notice after
filing with the clerk a true copy of such alias notice, returnable within the same time as if it were an original notice.
In such case any proceeding upon such alias notice shall be
deemed to have commenced from the date of the filing of the
original notice with the clerk. If such alias notice be returned by the proper sheriff "not found" further process
may 'be allowed in the discretion of the court upon such
terms as the court may see fit.
iSection 19. Other Provisions of Law Applicable. Rules
of law, statutory or otherwise, governing the procedure in
actions at law, shall apply to proceedings by motion for
judgment, in so far as they are not in conflict with the provisions of the preceding sections or inapplicable because of
the nature of the proceeding.
Section 20. Forms. The Judicial Council shall from
time to time prepare suitable instructions and forms for
proceedings by motion for judgment which may be followed
in pleading under the foregoing sections.
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CO3MENT ON PROPOSED ACT AMENDING MOTION
FOR JUD0GMENT PROCEDURE
Section 6.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT; CONTINUANCE.

The first sentence of this section extends the motion for
judgment to all cases in which actions at law might be
brought. The rest pf the material in the section is found
in the first and the last paragraphs of Ch. 56, Art. 1, Sec. 6
of the Proposed Code, the second paragraph of that section
being placed in Sec. 8 hereafter. Since the actions of detinue, ejectment and forcible entry and detainer are statutory, and for the further reason they are already rapid and
efficient, it is probable they will remain as they are and
proceedings by motion in such cases will not be attempted.
The same is probably true of extraordinary remedies such
as mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition. After considerable discussion it was deemed best to make the motion
apply to all actions at law, without attempting to make express exceptions. This was done in Virginia and the result
seems to be that the motion procedure is not used in the
actions above mentioned.
The third paragraph serves only to give further atmosphere to the system of procedure proposed.
Section 7.

JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND OF PARTIES; COUNTER-

CLAIMS.

Purpose. We have provided two alternative sections of
joinder. We unhesitatingly recommend the first one. The
problems of joinder of causes of action, joinder of parties
plaintiff, joinder of parties defendant, and also the problem
of counterclaims, are all one problem. Only one question
ever should arise in these cases and that is the convenience
of the Court in trying the case. The purpose of the section
therefore is to treat all these questions as one, and to allow
the Court an opportunity of trying such things together as
may conveniently and without confusion be tried together,
after hearing arguments on whether confusion will likely
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arise in the trial, and not arguments on interpretation of
rules of joinder as a logical system.
Souzce, .Ewplanationand Arguent.. In most codes and
at common law we find the problem of joinder divided and
each division treated separately. There are four classes
of cases.
1. Where one plaintiff (or joint plaintiffs) unites in a
single proceeding two or more causes of action against one
defendant.
2. Where two or more plaintiffs, each having a cause of
action against the same party or parties unite their causes
of action in one proceeding.
3. Where one plaintiff, or joint plaintiffs, having several
causes of action, each against a different party, unites them
in one proceeding.
4. Where the defendant wishes to try a separate cause
of action against the plaintiff in the same proceeding, by
way of counterclaim. (The language of the above classification is adopted from 26 Mich. L. lRev. 1.)
In most codes and at common law each one of these divisions is treated not only separately but differently. No
apparent relation between them and no consideration of
them as one problem is usually expressed in any statutory
provision or in the common law decisions. They are found
in different places in the codes and under different headings
in common law textbooks. Decisions on one of these questions do not refer to decisions on others. The result has
been confusion. We believe that it may be safely asserted
that at common law there is no satisfactory test as to (a)
what parties may be joined, and (b) what claims may be
joined. In codes which follow the historical distinctions
of the common law the problem has not been satisfactorily
solved. A tremendous amount of judicial construction has
been had upon these provisions and the result is not satisfactory. We believe however with Mr. Sunderland that
there is only one problem involved in all questions of
joinder. That problem is the convenience of the court and
the parties in trying the case. This applies to questions of
joinder of parties plaintiff, or parties defendant, of causes
of action and of counterclaims. It is believed further that
no general rule can be laid down in advance as to what
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classes of cases may be conveniently tried together. Cases
are not simple or complicated because of the form of action
under which they are brought. Their complications arise
from the situation which brings them forth. There is only
one person who can decide intelligently in a given case
whether a number of claims urged by different parties can
be disposed of in one proceeding, and that is the court
which has these parties before it. After hearing arguments
frankly directed toward the subject of convenience of trial
and not directed toward the interpretation of an attempted
logical system we propose to let the court after considering
the question argued on its merits determine the question of
convenience of trial. As Mr. Sunderland has pointed out
it is much easier to sever causes of action than it is to
consolidate them.
Looking at the question as a matter of convenience at
the trial (which seems to us the only realistic way of looking at it since our attempted emphasis in the whole act is
on the trial), what fundamental difference can there be between the problem of joinder of causes of action, joinder of
parties plaintiff, joinder of parties defendant, and the trial
of counterclaims? In any one of these classes of cases it
may be inconvenient to try the issues together. In any one
of them it may be convenient. In no one of those classes,
however, is there any greater chance of convenience or inconvenience than in any other.
We recognize however that the idea of broad joinder of
claims, parties and counterclaims has always been regarded
with grave misgivings by most intelligent lawyers. The restrictions upon joinder of claims and parties are so ancient
and supported 'by such respectable authority and reasoning,
that it is not surprising that broad provisions of joinder
have been regarded as rather startling innovations. It
has been necessary to study the subject historically and seek
the origin of the common law doctrines as to joinder before any hearing could be obtained for changing it. Mr.
Sunderland of Michigan has been a leader in this work.
For the argument which we use here we are indebted to
him and to Mr. William Wirt Blume, one of his research
assistants. In two articles appearing in the Michigan Law
Review, (Vol. 26, page 1, and vol. 18, p. 571) they have
covered the subject thoroughly.
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The usual reason given for the restrictions on joinder is
that "jurors are qualified to deal with simple questions
only-the fewer the better-and the common law rules as to
parties, as well as those relating to the formation of issues,
were adapted to the nature of the tribunal before which the
cases were to be tried." (26 Mich. L. Rev. p. 3.) Historical research however shows that this dogma is simply a
rationalization of an historical accident. The reason that
joinder was refused at common law in types two and three
above arose out of the trial by ordeal. One person could
not be both victor and vanquished in a trial by battle and
in a wager of law the issue was on the general veracity of
the party. Therefore only one controversy could be settled
in one proceeding. (Holdsworth, History of the English
Law, v. 3, p. 639, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 2, 3.) This history is
developed at -some length by Mr. William Wirt Blume in
the above article and we believe he thoroughly establishes
the fact that there was no rational basis for the modern
restrictions on joinder. Further than that Mr. Sunderland with his usual careful scholarship has shown that there
is no possible test of misjoinder at common law which will
work even in a reasonably large number of cases. (See
article in 18 Mich. L. Rev. p. 571.) Space does not permit
us to develop Mr. Sunderland's argument and we therefore
merely quote his conclusion:
"One aspect of the case brings out in strong relief
the inherent hollowness and unreality of the doctrine
of misjoinder as a substantial fault in pleading.
The judges could not agree on the true rules respecting joinder of forms of action. The plaintiff's case
suffered capital punishment, so to speak, for an error
in this regard, but the courts could not tell him with
any certainty how to avoid it. A paragraph from
Tidd quaintly expounds this remarkable situation.
(We omit quotation from Tidd.)
"This amazing incongruity did not seem to call for
any apologetic explanation from the profession.
None of the classical writers on common law pleading and none of the judges of that era appeared to
have been disturbed by the anomaly. The doctrine
of misjoinder was a professional tradition, which had
always been recognized in some form or other, and
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was fully justified by the antiquity of its ancestry.
The perils of misjoinder were inherent risks which
had to be patiently endured by the people, like the
perils of war and contagious disease. If the problem
of defining and identifying misjoinders was too difficult for the courts to solve, why blame the courts?
They were only human and could not be expected to
do impossible things.
"This attitude marked the culmination of what may
'be considered the complacent period of procedural
despotism. From this position the courts have receded under the pressure of hostile criticism or under legislative orders, until it can hardly be said
that a single rule or a single principle which looked
so impressive and was taken so seriously a hundred
years ago, has come unscathed through the hardships
of the gTeat retreat. There are still outposts in the
old procedural front line trenches, held by devoted
courts who worship Chitty and the old regime, but
they are isolated and all but surrounded, and their
fall is inevitable."
Treatment of Misjoinder Under the Codes.
In the original New York Code there was very little improvement over the common law system. Section 143 of
the Code of 1848 gave seven cases where joinder might be
had, which are not much of an improvement on the common
law. Most of the states usually classified as code states,
except Arizona and Iowa, followed the original code in the
adoption of arbitrary classification of joinders. Today
however in New York there is the same liberty of joinder
as to parties which we have set out in our section excepting
that parties plaintiff and parties defendant are treated in
different sections of the code.
Speaking of joinder of causes of action Mr. Sunderland
has said:
"Accordingly, in default of any rational basis for
a system of rules on joinder relating to the form, nature or subject-matter of actions, we reach the final
stage of development, where it is frankly admitted
that the common law created imaginary difficulties in
joining actions, that the code retained them with
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substantial but illogical variations, that all a priori
restrictions fail to meet the needs of practical litigation, and that only by allowing an unlimited freedom of joinder can the maximum of convenience in
the trial of actions be attained. If a plaintiff joins
too many actions it is easy to separate them for
trial, while if he severs them it may be very hard to
effect a consolidation, owing to differences in the
time of reaching issue, lack of initiative in bringing
about a consolidation, and the possibility that they
may be pending in different courts." 18 Mich. L.
Rev. 581.
In regard to joinder of parties the English amendment
of 1896 is similar to ours. It reads as follows:
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where if such persons
brought separate actions any common question of law
or fact would arise; provided that, if. upon the application of any defendant it shall appear that such
joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the Court or a Judge may order separate trials,
"
or make such other order as may be expedient *
26 Mich. L. Rev. 23.
The same idea is found in New York, Connecticut, Ontario and several other states. Space forbids a summary
of the various types of statutes in this comment. This
work has been done sufficiently well in Clark on Code
Pleading, and in the article in 26 Mich. L. Rev. p. 1. In
this comment we have simply tried to give an idea of the
uselessness of the restrictions on joinder without going
into scholarly detail.
If we may summarize however we may set out three general notions to be found in the various statutes:
(1) Arbitrary classifications of cases which may be
joined. We have discarded this notion because we believe
that its uselessness is demonstrated.
(2) A common test is as follows: Actions arising out
of the same transaction or transactions connected with the
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same subject of action, may be joined. We quote Sunderderland's comment. "This section introduces necessity of
construction of three terms, (1) transaction, (2) subject
of action, (3) and connected wvith&, none of which had any
precise meaning. * * * And the volume of litigation which
has resulted from the effort to define and administer this
vague rule is distressingly large." (See Sunderland, 18
Mich. L. Rev. 579 and cases in footnote.)
(3) The test of "common question of law and fact".
This test we have included in our section. We confess that
it is vague but we believe that this language gives the
proper atmosphere to the statute, which we consider important.
Our section is not novel except in one respect. It treats
all problems of joinder as one problem and combines them
in one section. In doing this we have the approval of Mr.
Clark of Yale who has made an extensive study of the subject. The unrestricted joinder idea is not new and is
found in various forms in Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, the
New England states, England; Ontario and New York.
Statistics on Unrestricted Joinder in Actual Practice.
We realize that on first reading of the section an immediate reaction will be that if it is actually made a rule
of practice, one-half of the state of West Virginia will bring
suit against the other half. The harassed court before
whom this complex action is brought will spend the next
two years in adding and dropping parties and causes of
action from this prodigious litigation. To quiet this fear it
is necessary to examine what actually happens under unrestricted systems of joinder. The fact is that suits of this
kind are not brought. No plaintiff ever wants to drag in
unnecessary trouble. The only statistics which we -havehad
available are the judicial statistics collected by Dean Clark
of Yale Law School in Connecticut and Massachusetts. Mr.
Harris of the faculty of the Law School of Ohio State University, kindly consented to examine these statistics for us
in detail on the question of joinder. His findings were that
no complicated cases of joinder arose and no abuse of the
liberal provision of joinder was discoverable. We call attention to the fact that his study was made not merely of
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cases in the appellate court but of every case which was
brought before any nisi prium court in Connecticut. It is
true that if lawyers deliberately start out to make trouble
they can do so under any system of pleading, but after all
some trust must be put in the bar. If this trust is misplaced no attempted restrictions can prevent them from, or
ever have prevented them from, creating confusion in actions at law. We believe it is sufficient answer to the fear
that cases will become unduly confused to point out that in
no state where this unrestricted joinder provision has beeir
used have the cases been confused and we know of no complaint arising from any of these jurisdictions.
In conclusion we wish to reiterate (1) that the problem
of joinder both of causes, of parties, and of counterclaims is
one which is entirely concerned with the convenience of the
trial court; that there is no rational method of determining in advance by rule in what cases this confusion will
arise. The court must determine that from an examination of the actual situation before him. (2) Under our
system the court will be aided by arguments which bear directly on the question of convenience instead of arguments
on ancient authorities and logical deductions which have absolutely nothing to do with getting the case to trial. (3)
The appellate court will be free from the trouble and necessity of reversing the trial court where the trial court
thought that convenience would be served by joining or not
joining the actions. See Shaver v. Security Trust Co., 82
W. Va. 618, and Halsby v. Lanark Co., 55 W. Va. 484. Certainly as Mr. Sunderland points out the penalty for mistaken joinder is too severe if it includes the loss of the
plaintiff's case on something not connected with the merits.
Our idea is that if the plaintiff loses his case he should
lose it at the trial and not before the trial.
,Section 8.

AFFIDAVIT OF CLAII-JUDGMENT.

Purpose. The purpose of this section is familiar. It
provides a method of taking a default judgment on affidavit
without the necessity of further proof.
Source and Explanation. This section contains the provisions of the second paragraph of section 6, article 2,
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chapter 56 of the draft of the Revised Code. It is slightly
simplified in its language but the substance is preserved.
The words "and unpaid" following "due" are omitted as it
seems that such preciseness in the wording of the statute
has led to an unduly technical attitude on the part of the
court, as shown in the case of Marstiller v. Ward, 52 W.
Va. 74.
It is to be noted that chapter 39 of the Laws of 1929 has
amended the section on motion for judgment by adding the
provision that "the affidavit of the plaintiff * * * shall be
legal evidence of plaintiff's claim". This provision is not in
the -draft of the revised code and would seem to be unnecessary in view of the fact that there is a provision that in default of an affidavit and plea, judgment should be entered
for the plaintiff. This provision seems to be preferable to
the 1929 amendment in view of the fact that it makes it
clear that the judgment is to be entered on the plaintiff's
affidavit alone whereas the 1929 amendment still leaves the
question open as to whether or not the affidavit of the plaintiff is the only evidence necessary.
The last sentence is new in this section and permits the
plaintiff to fie an affidavit after the commencement of the
proceeding, where the defendant does not appear. This obviates the necessity of holding an inquiry as to damages in
case of defendant's default where no affidavit was originally served. It merely carries over' into the motion for judgment proceeding the provision of section 46, chapter 125
of the Barnes' Code (Draft Rev. Code, ch. 56, art. 4, sec.
51) applying to actions for the recovery of money on contracts. The statement here is more direct than that of
section 46 and also precludes the question whether the affidavit is the only evidence necessary, which that section
also leaves open. Of course this would not prevent the
plaintiff from having an inquiry of damages if he prefers
to resort to that method rather than to file an affidavit.
In order to make this section fit in with the rest of the
procedure contemplated in this report, it is provided that
no "notice of defense setting forth a defense on the merits"
shall be filed 'by the defendant rather than that no "plea"
should be filed. Section 46 of chapter 125 has already been
construed not to preclude the filing of a plea in abatement.
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Netter, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Elfant, 63 W. Va. 99 (1907),
and that decision would of course be a precedent for the
notice of motion procedure. Since it is provided in Section 14 that matters in abatement may be set forth in the
notice of defense it has been thought well to word the section so as to make it clear that matters in abatement could
be presented without the filing of an affidavit by the defendant.
Since certain defenses may be made without filing a notice of defense, under section 13, there is the possibility that
the defendant might make a defense on the merits based on
the matters listed, 5-11, under that section. However, since
the defendant in proceeding under section 13 is required to
file an affidavit it seems unnecessary to require him to file
this additional affidavit before making the defense in the
manner provided for by section 13.
It will be seen that the changes made in this section are
only those necessary to make the procedure fit in with the
rest of the provisions here recommended, and no substantial change is suggested. Attorneys are familiar with the
method of taking judgment by default on affidavit and
would find that they could proceed under this section exactly as they have in the past in actions at law for the recovery of money on contract or in proceedings by motion
for judgment.
Section 9.

NOTICE OF DEFENSE--FURTHER PLEADING.

Purpose. This section is designed to provide a method
whereby the defendant may make an informal defense in a
proceeding brought by notice of motion. The purpose of
this section is to require the defendant to give the same kind
of notice of his defense, without detail or set form, which
the plaintiff does of his claim. Our idea throughout this
act is that of informal notice pleading subject to the control of the court. We must therefore make it uniform for
both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Sozrce and Ecplwnation. The informal notice of defense
is substituted for all common law pleas and is the only way
in which the defendant may state his defenses. This method
has never been used in West Virginia. In Virginia, how-
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ever, the amendment of 1919 provides for this informal defense as an optional method. The answers to our questionnaire sent to Virginia judges and lawyers show that this
method has practically superseded the practice of filing
common law pleas in a large number of Virginia counties.
Those who have used it prefer it to the former method of
making defense. Much of the advantage which may be derived from the procedure by motion is destroyed if common
law pleas are allowed. After the notice of motion is served,
the proceeding continues precisely as a common law action
with all of the emphasis upon technical accuracy and logical symmetry which it is our desire to avoid. A system of
pleading in which informality ceases with the serving of
the notice can only be a half-way measure and cannot be
much of a step forward in the direction of procedural reform. Attorneys who are accustomed to stating claims in
an informal way should have little difficulty in accustoming themselves to stating their defense in the same manner.
The name "notice of defense" given to the statement
Which the defendant may file is used advisedly. We recognize, as we have pointed out in our preliminary remarks,
that the psychology and atmosphere surrounding the procedure is the most important factor in determining how it
is actually to operate. By calling the defendant's statement a "notice of defense" we hope to encourage informality and brevity of statement.
The provision that the parties are to be deemed at issue
after the notice of defense is filed and that there should be
no further pleading in the nature of a replication is taken
directly from the Virginia code. The object is to avoid a
multiplicity of paper work by attorneys which can serve no
useful purpose and will only produce further wrangling
prior to the actual trial. There are, however, cases where
issues may need clarification and where a pleading in the
nature of a replication is necessary in order to enable the
parties adequately to make their preparations for the
trial. This contingency is taken care of by the provision that further pleadings may be ordered. It is in
line with our general purpose of giving control over the
pleadings to the trial court, so that useless paper work may
be avoided, and yet Where further clarification is necessary
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the court has the power to compel such clarification. In
some instances this result may better be accomplished by
an amended pleading rather than additional pleading, and
in order to make this possible the wording of the section
gives the court the power to require amended pleadings
also.
The second paragraph is found in substance in the English rules and is also in the statutes governing pleading in
many states of this country. The Virginia statute has no
such provision and the question has arisen as to whether
it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove his entire case even
when some of 'his allegations are not denied by the de.
fendant. It is probable that such a provision as this will
only lead to more extensive denials by the defendant so
that the ultimate result will not be essentially different
from the one that would be reached if the plaintiff should
be required to prove his entire case even when there is no
denial of parts of it. The principal purpose of the provision here is to settle the question that would be bound to
arise on this point.
The exception as to allegations in the notice of defense
bearing upon a counterclaim is necessary because of the
literal force of the preceding sentence which would make it
necessary for the plaintiff in filing his notice of defense to
counterclaim to deny other allegations in the notice of defense which he did not wish to admit. The notice of defense to counterclaim should be confined to stating the defense to the counterclaim alone and matters not relating
to the counterclaim should not be incorporated in it.
The third paragraph might be unnecessary in view of section 19 which makes other provisions of law applicable to
a proceeding by motion. However, the statement of section 5, article 5, referred to, is that the defendant may file a
plea alleging matter entitling him to relief in equity and as
a precautionary measure it was thought advisable to state
expressly that such matter could be stated in the notice
of defense. Other matter permitted to be stated in a plea
under section 5 of article 5 in the nature of pleas of set-off
is taken care of by the liberal counterclaim provisions of
section 7, and consequently no reference need be made in
this section.
We would unhesitatingly recommend allowing the de-
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fendant to set up in any proceeding, matter entitling him
to relief in equity against the plaintiff's claim. This would
constitute an extension of the rule provided for in section
5, article 5, since that section applies only to contract actions. If a broader provision for equitable defenses is
enacted, however, it should be done by a general statute
applying to all actions. If it were confined to a proceeding by motion for judgment alone it might have a tendency
to discourage plaintiffs from using this form of procedure.
Section 10.

NOTICE OF DEFENSE TO COUNTERCLAIM.

The purpose of this section is obvious. In some states
where the defendant sets up a counterclaim the plaintiff
must file a further pleading which must state the defenses
to the counterclaim and must also deny such new matter in
the plaintiff's pleading as he does not care to admit. It
seems, however, that the pleading which the plaintiff should
file when the defendant sets up a counterclaim should confine itself to the counterclaim unless there are special reasons for further pleading as to the original claim of the
plaintiff. Where such reasons exist, the provisions of the
preceding section permit this upon a court order, but where
they do not exist it seems useless to require any further
pleading as to the original claim.

Section 11. VERIFICATION OF PLEADINGS.
iProvisions as to verification should follow the practice in
actions at law. The only reason for this section is occasioned by the fact that no pleas are required as such and
consequently a defendant might be in doubt as to the procedure to be followed. This simple provision for a separate
affidavit makes the practice clear.
Section 12.

OBJECTION TO PLEADING.

Purpose. We have here presented alternative sections.
We favor the first one. Most of the provisions of this section would be followed apart from any express provision.
The purpose is to outline the procedure more completely
and further to provide for the waiver of certain objections

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

57

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC.

after a limited period, thus avoiding continued controversies on pleading points and the attendant delay.
Source and Explanation. Our statute (Barnes' Code, ch.
134, sec. 3) provides that practically all defects in the pleadings are waived if not taken advantage of before judgment.
The section here proposed provides for the waiver of less
important defects at an earlier time. Although the general
purpose of this whole procedure is to restrict objections to
matters of substance, there may be some less important
matters which may properly be objected to at the outset of
the case. This is permitted, but is rather closely restricted. There is no particular reason for giving the
parties any further time in which to make such objections
and especially is it unfortunate if such objections are made
after the case has gone to trial.
The exceptions listed are obviously necessary. If any
pleading discloses a lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, that can of course never be waived.
Any other defect, however, should be waived unless it is
so substantial as to prejudice the adverse party. If, for
instance, the notice of motion should fail to state a claim
and be so indefinite that the defendant could not adequately prepare for trial, it would seem that such notice of motion should be quashed, even after the time limit has expired. Any other rule would penalize the defendant too
heavily for his failure to take the objection before filing
his notice of defense.
Doubtless this section does not change the practice now
existing to the extent that might be supposed from a casual
reading. The court may still even after the time limit has
expired quash a pleading that is wholly unsubstantial, but
the wording of the statute emphasizes the fact that the consideration involved is the effect of the defect upon the conduct of the case .by the opposing parties. This provision
simply emphasizes and extends to all pleadings the statement which has been repeatedly made by the Supreme
Court of Appeals with respect to a notice of motion that it
is sufficient if it acquaints the defendant with the grounds
on which he is to be proceeded against however wanting it
may be in form and technical accuracy. See Kelley Co. v.
Phijlips, 102 W. Va. 85 (1926). It is true in a general
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way that the further the case has progressed, the less a
court is likely to permit pleading objections. The provisions of this section carry out and give legislative sanction to this eminently proper attitude of the court.
The provision for a motion to require a party to amend a
pleading does not make any substantial change in the
present procedure as a motion to quash if granted may ordinarily be followed by amendment of the pleading. It is
thought, however, that in some cases it might be more convenient to make the motion in the form stated.
,Section 13.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN DEFENSES.

Purpose. This section provides for the summary determination of cases which can be shortly disposed of on
some narrow and familiar issue. The chief advantage is
that it may dispense with the necessity of a trial where that
would only be a needless expenditure of time and effort.
We have in section 17 provided for a summary disposition
of the plaintiff's case without formal trial, limiting that
procedure to cases where experience has shown this may be
done. The present section is in a sense the analogue of the
section providing for summary judgment for plaintiff, although the types of cases lending themselves to a summary
disposition in favor of the defendant are quite different
from those where a summary judgment may be readily
given for the plaintiff. Each may stand on its own merits,
but both are desirable in that they save the time of the
court and parties.
Source and Explanation. The test used in determining
what defenses may be included in this section is whether it
is a defense which may be disposed of quickly and on simple facts, without reference to other more complicated issues of fact. Each of these defenses in the majority of
cases may be disposed of quickly. Others might be added
as experience dictates the necessity, but those included here
are all that we feel are necessary at present.
The types of cases where it is expedient to allow a summary disposition of the defendant's case are chosen not
only by logic but by actual experience. The provisions of
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this section have for some time been in effect in various
states and have been incorporated into the rules framed
by the Michigan Commission, of which Mr. Sunderland is
a member, and recently adopted by the Supreme Court of
Michigan. We have added to the list of defenses the first
and eleventh which we have thought could also be disposed
of in a summary way on affidavit.
It is true that occasionally the issues of fact arising on
these defenses may not lend themselves readily to determination by affidavit. Accordingly the procedure is made
flexible so that in the discretion of the court such matters
may be tried out on oral evidence presented by the parties.
Where the other issues in the case are not badly complicated
it may be that it would be more convenient to try all the
issues at once. It is therefore provided that the court in
its discretion may refuse to decide the issue and give leave
to the defendant to set forth the defenses in his notice of
motion. In such an event the issues would be tried out at
the same time as the other issues in the case are tried.
Section 14.

MATTERS IN ABATEMENT.

The provisions of this section are probably unnecessary
as this result would be reached by construction of the other
sections in the light of the existing practice. We insert it
here merely for the sake of clarity and completeness.
Section 15.

TRiAL.

Purpose. The wording of this section is designed to encourage trials without a jury, although it is framed in such
a way that there can be no question -that it preserves the
constitutional requirement for a jury trial.
The purpose of the second paragraph is to give added
flexibility to the procedure so as to leave the question of the
separate trial of issues on matters in abatement to the discretion of the court.
Source and Explanation. The first paragraph is taken
from the present section governing the trial of issues arising in notice of motion proceedings (Barnes' Code, Ch. 12 .
sec. 8). The provision that the court may call fok a jury,
although neither party desires it, is omitted as this seebis to
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be an unnecessary and unused provision. The last sentence
providing that otherwise trial should be before the court
without a jury merely emphasizes the fact that it requires
affirmative action by the parties to secure a jury trial and
that unless such action is taken the normal procedure is
for the issues to be tried before the court without a jury.
Under the present procedure in actions at law matters in
abatement must be tried first. (Barnes Code, Oh. 125, Sec.
21.) Although this in the great majority of cases would
be the most convenient procedure and would make it unnecessary for the parties to put in their complete proof
when there is a possibility of disposing of the case without
trying the main issue, nevertheless it is conceivable that occasions might arise where matters in abatement could be
conveniently tried along with the issues of fact on the
merits. This paragraph is in harmony with our general
idea of having a flexible procedure and leaving the question
of the order of trial to the discretion of the court.
We have already provided in section 9 for the setting up
of equitable defenses in the notice of defense. Presumably
under the existing practice in actions at law the issues of
fact arising on such defenses would be tried before a jury
unless the parties waived it. It is felt however that ordinarily the issues arising on equitable defenses will lend
themselves more readily to trial before a court, and since
on equitable matters the constitution would not require a
jury trial, this paragraph makes it permissible to try such
issues without a jury. Of course if the court thinks it more
convenient, such issues might be submitted to a jury along
with other issues on the merits.

Section 16.

VARIANCE.

Purpose. This section provides a liberal rule for taking
care of variances. It is designed to prevent useless new
trials because of technical objections which can have no relation to the fairness of the trial or general principles of
justice.
Rource and Explanation. The present section as to
-Vri?, (Barnes' Code, ch. 131, sec. 8) is liberal and pro-,ds a nfethod for disposing of most of the points that will
arise en the question of variance on a just basis. We be-
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lieve, however, that there may be an advantage in making a
distinction between a material and an immaterial variance
such as the present statute does not make. If a variance
between the proof and the pleading is such that the adverse
party has been misled to his prejudice, considerations of
justice plainly require that the amendment should be made
and further time should be given for him to prepare his
defense. The phrase in this section "upon such terms as
may be just" of course permits the trial court to grant a
continuance if that is necessary and is thus in accord with
the present law. If the variance is immaterial presumably
the trial court under the present law would not grant a
continuance but would simply order an amendment and
proceed with the trial of the case. Furthermore under the
statute of jeofails, (Barnes' Code, ch. 134, sec. 3) an objection on the ground of a variance could not 'be taken after
verdict. This provision would continue to be applicable to
the new procedure although as a matter of form we have
provided that either the trial court or the appellate court
might Inake an amendment after judgment. It has further
been provided that if the variance is immaterial, since it
has not misled the adverse party to his prejudice, then the
overruling of an objection made at the trial would not be
such error as to constitute grounds for reversal. The appellate court however may still make the necessary amendment. It is felt that this is an improvement over the present procedure where the possibility remains that the appellate court might reverse where the variance was not
such as to mislead the adverse party and 'where a fair trial
has already been had.
Section 17.

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CERTAIN OASES.

Purpose. The purpose of this section is to secure to the
plaintiff a speedy method of obtaining judgment when there
is no defense, without the delay and expense incident to a
trial, in certain types of cases which lend themselves
readily to a summary method of procedure. We have already discussed our proposed section 13 which enables the
defendant to present certain defenses which can readily
be tried out on affidavits without resorting to trial. There
gre also cases where the requirement of affidavits on the
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part of the defendant setting forth his defense may serve to
search his conscience and prevent him from delaying the
case where there is no actual defense. The subject of the
summary judgment is covered in an article by Charles E.
Clark and Charles U. Samenow (38 Yale L. J. 423). We
quote from the introductory paragraph which summarizes
in an admirable way -the advantages of this method of procedure.
"Dissatisfaction in and out of the profession with
the 'law's delay' has long been manifested. As an
effective remedy for such delay within the limits prescribed by its form and purpose, the summary judgment procedure has become an important feature of
the most modern practice systems. Under this procedure judgment may be entered summarily for the
plaintiff -in the more usual types of civil actions, on
motion setting forth his demand and his belief that
there is no defense to it, unless the defendant, by
counter-affidavit, shows that the facts are in dispute.
The reform is usually advocated because of its effectiveness in preventing delays by defendants, and
in securing speedy justice for creditors. But its advantages would seem to be more than merely these.
Because of its simplicity it is available for the prompt
disposition of bona fide issues of law as well as of
sham defenses. Except where a trial is necessary to
settle an issue of fact, the whole judicial process is,
by this procedure, made to function more quickly
and with less complexity than in the ordinary long
drawn out suit."
Source and Explanation. The summary judgment provision was first introduced in England in 1855. It has
worked well there and has been since adopted in some form
in a large number of other jurisdictions. The most extensive rules for summary judgment are to be found in Connecticut, New York, Michigan, New Jersey, Delaware and
the British Colonies. The present statutory provision in
West Virginia applicable to actions or motions to recover
money on contracts in requiring an affidavit by the defendant before a defense on the merits is filed is a form of summary judgment, but it is slightly different in that it is primarily a provision to take care of defaults. It should be

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929

63

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1929], Art. 3

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC.

noted (1) that this section provides for the filing of the affidavit by the plaintiff after the defendant appears; (2) the
judgment rendered is not a default judgment; (3) the
plaintiff and defendant in their respective affidavits swear
not as to their belief in the claim or defense but as to the
truth of the facts upon which the claim or defense is based.
We have considered changing the present section to
make it conform more closely to the English method of
procedure, but we have come to the conclusion that a
separate section was preferable. The existing provisions
are familiar to the attorneys of this state and in their present form may be used in cases of default. The new section
may be invoked even if the defendant does file a defense on
the merits, for the purpose of searching his conscience to
determine whether there is really any substance to his defense. It goes much further than the existing provision.
It is, however, more closely restricted as to the type of case
in which it may be invoked. The present section applies
broadly to actions to recover money on contracts whether
liquidated or not. The new section applies only to liquidated claims, as experience has shown that the advantages of the procedure can best be obtained in cases involving such claims.
,Some rules for summary judgment apply to types of
cases other than those we have listed. The recently established Connecticut rule includes actions for the recovery
of specific chattels, to quiet title to real estate and to foreclose mortgage liens. Equitable causes, however, cannot
be included in this draft since it covers only cases on the
law side of the court. We have also thought that our
detinue remedy as it now exists is fairly speedy, and it
would be impossible to frame a section to fit in with our
detinue procedure without making it too complex. The
judgment in a detinue action, for example, is that the plaintiff recover the chattel or if it is not recoverable, the value
thereof as found by the jury. Obviously no summary judgment could designate the value, since that can only be determined on evidence. We could not extend summary
judgments to detinue cases, therefore, without providing
for a new type of judgment, and we have felt this would
constitute a departure from the existing law that would
not be justified by the advantages to be derived.
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Section

18.

(COMMENOEMENT OF PROOEEDING.

Purpose. This section provides for the commencement of
the proceeding prior to service of the notice at the option
of the plaintiff, since there are cases where this is desirable.
Source and Explanation. The first provision is in accord
with existing law as to notice of motion proceedings. See
Charlton v. Pacake, 98 W. Va. 363 (1925). The proviso
clause is new and would seem to be necessary in a case
where the statute of limitations is about to run or where
the plaintiff wishes to have an attachment.
If the plaintiff is not permitted to begin the proceedings
before the service of the notice he is under a distinct disadvantage in bringing this kind of a proceeding instead of a
common law action where he can begin the action by filing
his praecipe with the clerk. In code states where the action
is ordinarily commenced by service of the summons a special provision has been enacted whereby the action may be
commenced in cases where the statute is about to run by delivering a copy of the summons to the sheriff. It is felt,
however, that the simpler procedure is to have him file a
copy of the notice of motion and thus commence the action
since this same procedure may be used in various cases
where it is desirable to commence the proceeding prior to
service of the notice.
Our attachment statute (Barnes' Code, c. 106, see. 1)
provides that an attachment may only be had at the commencement of the action or suit or at any time thereafter.
In Virginia under a similar attachment act, it has been held
that an attachment issued before a motion for judgment has
been filed is void since there is no suit pending until the return is made. (Furst v. Bank~s, 101 Va. 203.) But where
the attachment was after the return of the notice of motion
it was held valid since there was then an action at law
pending. (Breeden v .Powe1, 106 Va. 39. See Burks
Pleading and Practice 232-3.) These cases would doubtless
be followed in West Virginia.
It is apparent that it may often be desirable to have an
attachment prior to the service of the summons. The provision of this section will therefore be of advantage to the
plaintiff in enabling him to commence the proceeding and
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have an attachment prior to the service of the notice. He
will thus be in just as advantageous a position as in a common law action.
The provision that the date of the notice must be the date
of the filing of the copy or an earlier date makes it impossible for the plaintiff to allow the proceeding to continue indefinitely without any service. Section 6 provides that the
return day of the notice shall not be more than ninety days
from its date unless the commencement of the next succeeding term of court be more than ninety days from such date,
in which case the return day may be the first day of such
term. It is thus apparent that the return day must ordinarily be within ninety days from the date of the filing of
the copy under this section. Since the notice must be
served at least twenty days before the return day the time
within which the plaintiff may serve his notice after commencing the proceeding is limited. This puts him in substantially the same position that he would be in a common
law action where the return day of his writ must be within
ninety days of the date of the writ.
Ytoe on Time of Commencement of Judgment Lien. There
seems to be some difficulty in the present statutes as to just
when the judgmeint lien on a motion for judgment proceeding becomes effective. Common law judgments appear to
relate back to the first day of the term if the cause was in
such condition that judgment could have been rendered on
that day. (Dunns Emrs. vs. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349.) It
is not entirely clear just when a judgment on motion procedure commences to be a lien. Therefore if the Report of
the Code Revisers is not adopted by the legislature this matter needs clarification.
The new Code, Chapter 38, Art. 3, Sec. 6, while it deals
with this problem, would not be entirely satisfactory if the
procedure recommended in this report were adopted, because it was framed without this procedure in mind. We
believe that if the following section were added to our motion for judgment procedure the difficulty would be solved:
Every judgment for money rendered under this
proceeding shall be a lien on the real estate of the
defendant from the date that the notice of motion is
returned, or from the first day of the term in which
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said judgment is rendered, whichever date shall be
the later.
Such a provision makes the date of the commencement
of the lien clear and is also designed to prevent any defendant, against whom several suits are pending, from preferring such creditors as he may select by allowing them
to take judgment immediately, while delaying others.
:However we did not think it wise to insert such a provision in our proposed act for the following reasons: (1)
The question of the attachment of a lien might be considered
one of substantive law, and should not be included under
rules of procedure. (2) As a matter of convenient arrangement of the Code, such a provision should be included
in the chapter on liens. If the new Code were passed this
section should be included under Chapter 38, article 3.
We therefore confine ourselves to pointing out the necessity for some such provision in the chapter on liens, in the
event that our proposed act should be passed. The matter
is not of primary importance because a liberal interpreta.
tion of Sec. 6, Art. 3, Chap. 38, of the new code would give
the same result as the proposed section set out above.
Section 19.

OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW APPLICABLE.

Although we have outlined a fairly complete system of
procedure there are undoubtedly questions that will arise
which are not covered. The rules governing the practice
on demands for a bill of particulars and those governing
the conduct of a trial are among those which should be governed by the existing rules in actions at law. ,Even in the
absence of such a section as this the court would undoubtedly look to the existing rules governing actions at law in
order to fill up such gaps as may appear. This section
would give this express statutory sanction.
Section 20.

FORMS.

It will undoubtedly be helpful to attorneys to have a
schedule of forms to which they may refer in proceeding
under these sections. The schedule of forms attached to
this report will serve as an example of what the judicial
council might be expected to prepare, Other instructions
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which the judicial council would be in a position to give
might likewise be of assistance to attorneys in enabling
them to make effective use of this method of procedure.
Such instructions would, of course, have no -binding effect,
but the court might give such consideration to them as it
might choose in construing and interpreting the provisions
governing the procedure.
EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF PLEADING
ACTUALLY RAISED ON MOTION PROCEDURE AS
COMPARED WITH COMMON LAW PROCEDURE IN
THE LAST TEN VOLUMES OF THE VIRGINIA

REPORTS.
When any new system of pleading is proposed the first objection which is always raised is that it will be followed by
a period of judicial construction and confusion consequent
upon the uncertainities of such a construction. It is always argued that before the new system can be judicially
construed and these uncertainities removed a good many
years will have elapsed during which time the bar will be
working under the handicap of an ill-defined system of
pleading. The classic example of the confusion resultant
upon a new system is the original New York Code of Civil
Procedure which appears to have become very complicated
in the course of time.
The best way however of determining whether a system
of pleading involves a great deal of judicial construction
is to examine the cases which arise under it and see in how
many of them points of pleading are brought to the Supreme Court. Of course this method does not show how
many points of pleading were raised in the lower court and
later abandoned, but inasmuch as we have no judicial statistics on actions in the lower court our only method is to
count the cases in the Supreme Court. With this idea in
mind we have examined 282 cases in Virginia, starting from
the last printed volume, and counted the points of pleading
raised in both actions brought under the common law
forms and under the Virginia motion for pleading. Considering the results of this examination the following important considerations should be kept in mind, (1) The
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pt-ocedure under the motion for judgment has practically
supplanted the common law pleading in Virginia. Our reports from the clerks of courts show that it is used in from
ninety to ninety-five per cent of the cases. The common
law procedure has become so rare as to be an oddity. This
has happened in the past few years. (2) The motion for
judgment procedure is comparatively new in Virginia and
has had very little construction. It is only in the past
few years that it has become universal and as one goes
back in the reports the number of common law actions increase. Therefore the motion for judgment has had but a
few years of judicial construction whereas the common
law procedure has had several hundred. From an a priori
point of view therefore we would expect to find more
points of pleading raised for a decision of the Supreme
Court on motion for judgment than under the common law
procedure for the very adequate reason that a new method
which has been effective only a few years should logically
considered required more construction than a method which
has been construed for several hundred years. If therefore the results should show that there were still more
points of pleading raised in common law actions than there
were under this new procedure it would be almost conclusive that the new procedure was the better and more
simplified form.
As a matter of fact the results of an examination of the
Virginia cases show the surprising result that out of 182
cases brought on motion for judgment there were only
eight points of pleading raised in the Supreme Court, most
of them going to the sufficiency of the notice. Out of these
cases none were reversed. This makes a percentage of 4.4
of the cases in which points of pleading were raised under
th6 motion procedure. As contrasted with this we find
that during the same period of time there were only one
hundred cases of appeals which were brought under the
common law form of pleading. In fifteen of these cases
points of pleading were decided in the Supreme Court with
one reversal. There were two points of pleading raised
upon common law defenses to motions.
It therefore appears that there were nearly four times as
many points of pleading raised in the last ten volumes of
Virginia reports on the old common law proceeding which
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has been construed for so long as in the new motion for
judgment procedure which is only a few years old. These
statistics certainly show that the adoption of this form of
practice does not mean a period of uncertainty and confusion pending judicial construction. In fact it means less
uncertainty in pleadings than under the old system which
is so often credited with the virtue of certainty by many
members of the profession.
The following were the cases in the last ten volumes of
the Virginia reports in which points of pleading were raised
under the motion practice. 182 cases in all were decided
in these volumes under this practice.
151 Va. 409 at 415. Plaintiff limited in his recovery to
the case set out in the pleading.
151 Va. 458 at 470. Question of sufficiency of motion
and failure to charge negligence.
151 Va. 694 at 702. Question raised as to variance between motion and evidence introduced.
150 Va. 432 at 450, notice held effective in lower court
and not sufficiently stating cause of action. Affirmed in
upper court.
149 Va. 235 at 239-240. Question of amending the notice.
148 Va. 601. Question of sufficiency of a motion for
judgment in detinue.
143 Va. 656 at 682. Question of sufficiency of notice as
a basis of recovery on quantum meruit.
142 Va. 550. Question of sufficiency of notice. (Note.
In none of the cases was there a reversal on the point of
pleading.)
Cases in the last ten volumes of Virginia Reports in
which points of pleading were raised at common law actions. There were 100 of these cases in the last ten volumes.
150 Va. 82, 98.
150 Va. 276. Case reversed because wrong form of action was used.
149 Va. 200; 149 Va. 906; 148 Va. 573; 148 Va. 850 at
857; 147 Va. 542; 146 Va. 448; 146 Va. 553; 144 Va. 782;
144 Va. 795; 143 Va. 12; 143 Va. 168; 142 Va. 789. (Note:
There was one reversal under these fifteen cases.)
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(3) Cases where points of pleading were raised to a
common law plea to the motion procedure, in the last ten
volumes.
143 Va. 855 at 864. Question as to whether misjoinder
of parties can be raised by demurrer.
143 Va. 920 at 930. Question as to the sufficiency of a
plea of puis darrein continuance at common law which was
filed to a motion for procedure. (Note: These cases were
not counted in the percentage of common law points of
pleading raised although they properly might be.)
Cases where points of substantive law were raised under
the guise of pleading questions.
144 Va. 169. Question of amending the notice of motion
and subrogating the employe for the employee in a suit for
injuries suffered by the employee where the employer had
compensated the employee for injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
151 Va. 120. Question as to whether defendant had filed
certain pleas of usury too late.
151 Va. 495 at 498. Demurrer to motion for judgment on
the ground that as a matter of substantive law plaintiff
has no cause of action. (Note: These cases are not
counted as raising questions of pleading.)
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION
AMONG JUDGES, ATTORNEYS AND CLERKS
IN VIRGINIA.
We have gone to some trouble to study the actual working
of the motion procedure in Virginia as applied to all actions at law. The best method seemed to be to send out
letters to all the clerks of court, all of the judges, and about
fifty representative lawyers for whose selection we are indebted to Mr. Stuart Campbell, a member of the Board of
Law Examiners of Virginia. As a result of these statistics
the following statements may be made without hesitation.
(1) The motion for judgment procedure has practically
supplanted the common law actions in all classes of actions, both in tort and in contract. The only exceptions are
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where there is a special statutory form provided, such as
ejectment, and in cases of extraordinary remedy such as
mandamus, prohibition, etc.
(2) There is a practically unanimous approval of this
method of procedure among both bench and bar.
(3) Although there is an option of pleading common
law defenses to the motion, the informal method of defense
is becoming used in a majority of counties to the exclusion
of the old common law plea.
(4) The great majority of replies indicate that the informal method of defense is regarded as a quicker and more
convenient method of pleading than the old common law
pleas. This is remarkable in view of the fact that some
years ago the Supreme Court had grave doubt as to the
workability of the informal method of defense and even
went so far as to intimate that it was not the best way of
pleading in a motion for judgment proceeding. We attach
tables showing in detail the replies received.
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SCHEDULE OF FORMS.
Motion for Judgment on an Account.
To 0 ------- D --------- ----- , West Virginia.
'Please take notice that on ----day of ------- , 1929, I
shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
-County,
West Virginia, at the court house in
-,
at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment against
This sum is due and owing
you for the sum of $ -....
by you to me, with interest thereon, for goods sold and delivered by me to you as per itemized statements of account
rendered you from time to time, copies of which are hereto
attached. At which time and place you may appear if you
see fit.
Dated this ---- day of -------- 1929.
B ----------Plaintiff
A ---------His Attorney
By -----------------Notice of Defense.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of ---------A------------- Plaintiff,

County.

No. -----

VS.

C -----

D ------- Defendant.
S-------D-------appears by his attorney and says
that said goods were sold to the defendant by the agent of
the plaintiff who agreed they were to be in accord with a
certain sample, but none of said goods delivered were in accord with said sample but were much inferior and all of
said goods were promptly returned by the defendant to the
plaintiff for this reason, therefore none of the alleged sums
are due the plaintiff.
C---------D
His Attorney
By -------------------
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Motion for Judgment for Slander.

To C-------- D --------- ----- , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the -_ day of ------- , 1929, I
shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
- county, West Virginia, at the court house in
, at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment against
you for damages in the sum of -----Said damages
were suffered because that during October, 1929, in the City
of Morgantown, West Virginia, in the hearing of other persons you spoke to and concerning me the following words,
which from their usual construction and common acceptance are construed as insults and tend to violence and
breach of the peace, to-wit:
"You are dishonest in your dealings."
"You ought to be arrested."
"You are a confidence man."
Dated this ----day of ------- ,1929.
A --------- B
By -----------------His Attorney
Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Slander.
State of West Virginia,
----- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of -------- County. No.------A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
o----- D ------- Defendant.
I, C------- D------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That I did not speak the words set out in the plaintiff's motion.
2. That the words set out in the plaintiff's motion are
true.

0---------

D ---------

By -------------------

Defendant
His Attorney

Motion for Judgment Against Corporationsfor Personal
Injury.
To the -------- Bus Company, a corporation, -------West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ---- day of --------- 1929,
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I shall appear by my attorney, before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the court house in
-,
at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of .......This sum is due me from you
for damages suffered by me when struck by a bus negligently operated by your agent on ---------- Street near
Street in the City of Morgantown, West Virginia, on or about the ----day of -----, 1929. At
which time and place you may appear if you see fit.
Dated this ----day of -------- 1929.
A -------- B --------- Plaintiff
By ------------------His Attorney

Notice of Defense to Motionv for Judgment for Personal
Injury.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of ---------- County. No.......
A------------- Plaintiff,
VS.
------- D------- Bus Company, a corporation, Defendant.
The ------- D ------- Bus Company, a corporation,
appears by its attorney and says:
1. That at the time of the accident the plaintiff was
negligent and his injuries were the result of such negligence.
2. That the plaintiff's alleged injuries were not due to
the negligence of the defendant's servants.
3. That the plaintiff suffered no injury whatever as a
result of the alleged collision.
C -------- D -------- Bus Company, a
corporation,
Its Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment on a Promissory Note With Affldavit
for Summary Judgment.
To C------- D ------ , Grafton, West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ----- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the Circuit Court of
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County, West Virginia, in the court house at
- at the opening of court or as soon thereafter
- -,
as the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment
, this being the amount
against you for the sum of -----now due and owing to me from you on a certain negotiable
promissory note dated the ---- day of --------- , 1929,
which was made by you and was payable to me on the ---day of --------1929, with interest at 6 per cent. A copy
of said note is hereto attached.
A --------- B -------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By -----------------State of West Virginia,
------ County, to-wit:
A-------- B -------- being duly sworn says that he
knows of his own personal knowledge that the allegations
contained in the foregoing motion for judgment are true,
and he believes there is no defense to this claim thereon or
any portion of it.
B----------A - --------------Taken, sworn to and subscribed before me this
of ---------- , 1929.

----

day

Clerk or Notary.
Notice of Defense With Affidavit in Defense to Sumury
Judgment.
State of West Virginia,
------ County, SS:
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
------- D-------Defendant.
In the Circuit Court of ---------- County. No.......
C------- D------- appears by his attorney and says
that he has paid to the plaintiff all sums due upon the
note set out in the motion of the plaintiff.
S--------D
His Attorney
By -----------------State of West Virginia,
------- County, to-wit:
C -------- D -------- , being duly sworn, says that he
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knows of his own personal knowledge that the allegations
of the foregoing Notice of Defense are true.
-C---------- D -Taken, sworn to and subscribed before me this ----day
of -------- , 1929.
Clerk or Notary.
Motion for Judgment for Money Lent.
To C ------- D-------- ------- West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
-----County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
------- , at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of 550. This sum is due me because on
the
day of -------- 1929, I loaned you the sum of
500.00 to be repaid by you in thirty days, and you have not
repaid said money though thirty days have elapsed.
Dated this ----day of -------- , 1929.
A --------- B--------- Plaintiff
By ------------------His Attorney
Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Money Lent.
State of West Virginia,
---------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of ---------- County. No.---A ------- B------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C------- D ------- Defendant.
I, C------- D------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That the plaintiff did not lend me the sum of money
as he alleges or any part of the same.
2. That on the ----day of ------- , 1929, the plaintiff
and myself made an agreement whereby I delivered to him
goods worth one hundred dollars (5100.00) and he accepted
this in full satisfaction of all obligations then due him
from me.
o ------------ D His Attorney
By -------------------
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Motion for Judgment on a Merchant's Account.
West Virginia.
To -------- D-------- -----Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
- the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
This sum is due me from you
you for the sum of ....... for goods sold and delivered to you at my store at various
times from the ----day of --------- 1929, to the ----day
of ------- , 1929, which it was agreed should be charged
to you and that you should pay me the amount due thereon
on demand, but you have refused to pay the same though I
have made demand upon you.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A --------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment on Merchant's
Account.
State of West Virginia,
------ County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,

County.

No.......

VS.

O-----

D------- Defendant.
I, C ------- D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That I have paid to the plaintiff all sums due him
from me.
2. That the goods in question were delivered to one
who falsely represented that he was my duly
- authorized agent. The said --------- was not my agent
and received said goods and converted them to his own use
without my authority and without my knowledge and consent.
S----------D
His Attorney
By -------------------
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Motion for Judgment for Alienation of Affections.
To CD
,
., West Virginia:
'Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
-County,
West Virginia, at the Court House in
-at
the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of $10,000. I was and am the wife of
-of
the City of -------- , West Virginia, and
in 1928 and for years prior thereto was living happily with
my husband. In the year 1928 you by your acts, blanishments and seductions alienated the love and affections of
my husband and destroyed the happiness of my home. In
consequence of which I have lost the love, affection and
society of my husband and have been neglected and abandoned by him.
Dated this ...
day of -------- 1929.
A --------- B--------- Plaintiff
By ------------------ Her Attorney
Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Alienations
of Affections.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No. ......
A -------- B -------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C-------- D -------- Defendant.
I, ------- D------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That the plaintiff was and is not the wife of.......
of the City of -------- , West Virginia.
2. That the plaintiff was not at any time in the year
1928 living happily with her husband but had already been
abandoned by him, and that he did not then nor since,
have any love or affection for the plaintiff.
S----------D
By -----------------His Attorney
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Motion for Judgment for Assatlt.

To ------- D--------- ----- , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ----1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
- County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
- at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of $200. On the
day of --------1929, you, while standing near me in ------- , West Virginia, assaulted me by raising a heavy stick and threatening to strike me.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A--------- B --------- Plaintiff
By ------------------His Attorney
Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Assault.
State of West Virginia,
------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,

County.

No .....

VS.

-----

D ------- Defendant.
I, C
D------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That I did not raise a heavy stick and threaten to
strike the plaintiff.
2. That by way of a jest I raised a cane and told the
plaintiff I ought to hit him but the plaintiff knew this was
by way of jest.
S----------D
By ------------------His Attorney
Motion for Judgment Upon a Trade Acceptance.
To C------- D-------- ------ , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
- County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
- at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of $1200. On the ----day of------1929, you duly executed as acceptor a trade acceptance
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drawn by John Doe on the ----day of ------- , 1928, requesting you to pay to the order of said John Doe on the
----day of ------- , 1928, $1000.00 at the First National
Said John Doe endorsed the same for
Bank of -------value to me and I duly presented the same for payment and
still own said trade acceptance but it has not been paid.
1929.
,-Dated this ----day of
A --------- B--------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment Upon a Trade
Acceptance.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No .......
A------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C------- D ------- Defendant.
I, C - -- D ------- appear by my attorney and say
that said trade acceptance was drawn on me by John Doe
for the price of goods to be shipped by him consigned to me,
but John Doe did not intend to ship and did not ship any
such goods to me but intended to perpetrate a fraud and
this was known to the plaintiff at the time said trade acceptance -was endorsed to him.
S----------D
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Breach of Promise of Marriage.
, West Virginia.
To C------ D -----------Please take notice that on the --- day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
ounty, West Virginia, at the Court House in
-the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
-at
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of 510,000. On the ----day of------1929, in conversation with you I promised, at your request,
to marry you within a reasonable time and you promised to
marry me, and I confiding in said promise have always since
been and now am ready to marry you -but you refuse to
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marry me though a reasonable time has elapsed and though
I on the ----day of ------- , 1929, requested you to do so.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A -------- B --------- Plaintiff
Her Attorney
By -----------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Breach of
Promise of Marriage.
State of West Virginia,
------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.---A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C ------- D ------- Defendant.
I, C------- D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That at the time of the alleged promise the plaintiff
was lewd and unchaste and I was ignorant thereof and on
being informed for that cause refused to marry the plaintiff.
2. That at the time the supposed promise was made, I
was under the age of twenty-one years and as soon as I
reached twenty-one repudiated the supposed promise and
refused to marry the plaintiff.
D--------C---------His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment Against Railroad Company for
Personal Injury.
To The 0 -------- D-------- Company, a corporation,
Virginia.
-West
day of --------- 1929,
Please take notice that on the .-the circuit court of
before
I shall appear by my attorney
the Court House in
at
County, West Virginia,
soon thereafter as
as
at the opening of court or
-a
the matter can be heard and move for judgment against
you for the sum of 5,000. The defendant on the ----day
of ------- , 1929, was a common carrier of passengers by
railroad between -------- and ------- , West Virginia.
On said day I bought a ticket entitling me to transportation
from ------- to ------- and became a passenger in a car
of the defendant. While passing near the defendant's station at ------- a collision, caused by the negligence of the
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defendant's servants in switching a train from the main
track to a siding, occurred between said car and another
car of defendant whereby I had a leg broken and was otherwise bruised and injured.
Dated this ----day of -------- 1929.
A-------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By -----------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Tudgment of Passenger
Against Railroad Company for Personal Injury.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.......
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C ------- D ------- Company, a corporation, of------West Virginia, Defendant.
TheC -------- D -------- Company, a corporation of
West Virginia, appearing by its attorney says:
1. That the plaintiff did not buy a ticket entitling him
to transportation as alleged but intended to ride without
making any payment, and was a trespasser, whose presence
was unknown to those in charge of said car.
2. That the servants of the defendant were not guilty of
any negligence which caused injury to the plaintiff.
3. That neither the car in which the plaintiff was riding
nor the car which it collided with were owned by defendant
or operated by the servants of the defendant.
D ----------- Company,
C ---------a corporation,
Its Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Conveesioa

of Goods.

West Virginia.
To C ------- D -------------day of -------- 1929,
--the
on
that
notice
take
Please
the circuit court of
before
attorney
my
by
appear
I shall
the Court House in
at
Virginia,
West
County,
soon thereafter as
as
or
court
of
the opening
-at
judgment against
a
for
move
and
the matter can be heard,
day of ----------the
On
you for the sum of $220.00.
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1929, you had in your possession ten barrels of sugar belonging to me worth twenty dollars a barrel and wrongfully
sold said sugar without authority from me.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A-------- B--------- Plaintiff
By ------------------His Attorney
Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Conversion
of Goods.
State of West Virginia,
------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.....
A------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
------- D------- Defendant.
I, C -D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That the sugar in question did not belong to the
plaintiff.
2. That I did not sell said sugar 'but delivered it to a
bailee who still retains it for me in storage.
C---------D
By ------------------His Attorney
Motion for Judgment on a Covenant of Warranty.
To C------- D--------- ------ West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ---- day of ---, 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
- County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
- at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of 6000.00. On the ----day of------1928, you executed and delivered to me a deed of certain
land in -------- Bounded Northerly by the lands of John
Smith, South and Easterly by the lands of James Stiles and
Westerly by a Public Highway," said tract containing 80
acres, and in said deed you covenanted to warrant and defend said land to me against all lawful claims and demands.
You were not the lawful owner of said land but one William Brown was the lawful owner in fee simple, and on the
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----day of ------- , 1929, said Brown evicted me from the
same and still holds possession thereof.
Dated this ----day of -------- 1929.
A -------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motiom for Judgment on a Covenant
of Warranty.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------A------- B------- Plaintiff,

County.

No .......

VS.

------- D------- Defendant.
I, ------- D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
1. That the plaintiff has paid only $300.00 of the price
he agreed to pay for said land.
2. That the cause of action alleged did not accrue within ten years next before the commencement of said action.
3. That William Brown never has been and is not now
lawful owner of said land.
D--------C---------His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment on a Foreign Judgment.
To ------- D-------- ------- West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
West Virginia, at the Court House in
-County,
of court or as soon thereafter as
opening
the
-at
the matter can -be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of 2200.00. On the _,__ day of ------1928, at Columbus in the State of Ohio, the Circuit Court
of said State in action pending between me and you duly
adjudged that you pay to me $2000.00, and duly entered
judgment for that sum, but you have not paid said sum.
Dated this ---- day of ------- , 1929.
A -------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By -------------------
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Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment on a Foreign
Judgment.
State of West Virginia,
-------- County, SS:
In the Circuit 'Court of --------- County. No .....
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
Vs.
o----- D ------- Defendant.
- D ------- appear by my attorney and say
I, that on the ----day of ------- , I delivered to the plaintiff one automobile which the plaintiff accepted in full satisfaction of the alleged foreign judgment.
C--------- D--------- Defendant
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Rent Reserved in Lease
To C------- D -------- ------ , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
-at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of $225.00. On the ----day of-------1928, you entered into a lease under seal with me, a copy
of which is hereto annexed. By said lease rent was reserved
to me at the rate of 100 per month and though you occupied said premises you have not paid the rent due on the
first day of August and the first day of September, 1928.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A --------- B--------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Rent.
State of West Virginia,
------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.....
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C------- D ------- Defendant.
I) C_
D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
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1. That prior to the accrual of any of the alleged rent,
the plaintiff forcibly entered and took possession of a portion of the premises and has ever since held the same.
2. That by the said lease the plaintiff undertook to heat
the building on said premises to a comfortable temperature
at all times, but during the past winter wholly failed to
furnish any heat whatever, by reason of which I suffered
damages to the amount of $300.00.
0 -------- D --------- Defendant
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Libel.
To ------- D -------- ------ , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
-at
the matter can be heard, and move for a judgment against
day of------you for the sum of $3000.00. On the --West Virginia, you published in a letter
1929, at ---addressed to -------- the following words concerning me
"A------- B ------- is a man to avoid. He is in the
habit of obtaining goods on false representations." This
publication was false, malicious and insulting.
, 1929.
Dated this ---- day of - --A --------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Libel.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.......
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
----- D ------- Defendant.
D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
-I, C1. That the words quoted in the plaintiff's motion are
true.
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2. That the said -------- was considering employing
the plaintiff and inquired of me concerning his character,
so that my letter to him was in answer thereto and privileged.
C -------- D --------- Defendant
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Money Received by Defendant
Through a, Mistake of the Plaintiff.
West Virginia.
,,
To C -D
Please take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
-at the opening of court or as soon thereafter as
-the matter can be heard and move for a judgment against
you for the sum of @500.00. On the .--- day of --------1929, I intending to pay you $50.00 paid you $500.00 by
mistake and on the ----day of ------- , 1929, demanded
of you that the sum so paid be returned to me but you have
refused to pay the same.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A--------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Money Paid
Through a Mistake.
State of West Virginia,
-------- County, SS:
In the !Circuit Court of --------- County. No.---A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
C ------- D ------- Defendant.
I, C------- D ------- appear by my attorney say that
the plaintiff paid me only the sum of $50.00 as stated in his
motion and no more.
--------- Defendant
S------D
is Attorney
By -------------------
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Motion for Judgment on a Promissory Note-Second Endorsee Against Second Endorser.
To ------- D-------------- , West Virginia.
iPlease take notice that on the ----day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
the opening of said court or as soon there-at
after as the matter can be heard and move for a judgment
against you for the sum of $1200.00. You endorsed to me
a promissory note made by William Brown on the ----day
of -------- , 1929, for the sum of $1000.00 and payable
thirty days after date at the First National Bank of
Virginia, to the order of John Doe and
-West
endorsed in blank by him. On the day said note was due
the same was presented at said Bank for payment but was
not paid but notice thereof was duly given to you and I
still own said note and it has not been paid.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A -------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment on a Promissory
Note.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No .....
A ------- B------- Plaintiff,
VS.
o----- D------- Defendant.
I, .------- D------- appear by my attorney and say
that said note has been fully paid.
S--------D --------- Defendant
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Trespass-De Bonis.
To ------- D-------- ------ , West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the .... day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit cburt o'
West Virginia, at the Court Hoas in
-County,
at the opening of said court or as soon aeze------
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after as the matter can be heard and move for a judgment
against you for the sum of $60.00. On the ---- day of
, 1929, I was lawfully possessed of one desk, and
-you forcibly took said desk from my possession and carried
it away.
, 1929.
Dated this ----day of A -------- B -------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By ------------------Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Trespass.
State of West Virginia,
------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------- County. No.....
A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,
VS.
----- D ------- Defendant.
- D ------- appear by my attorney and say:
I) C.
1. That I took possession of said desk with the consent
and authority of the plaintiff.
2. That I owned said desk and the plaintiff was the
bailee at my will.
C --------- D --------- Defendant.
His Attorney
By -----------------Motion for Judgment for Trespass on Lan&
To 'C ------- D -------- ------- West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ---- day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the Court House in
-at the opening of said court or as soon there.
-after as the matter can be heard and move for a judgment
day of
against you for the sum of $100.00. On the
...-... , 1929, I. possessed certain land in -------- West
Virginia, bounded on the North by the land of John Doe,
on the East and South by a highway and on the West by
lands of Robert Rowe. On the said day you unlawfully
entered on the said land and cut and removed therefrom a
quantity of timber worth $90.00.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A--------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By -------------------
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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC.

Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Trespass on
Land.
State of West Virginia,
--------- County, SS:
In the Circuit Couurt of --------A ------- B ------- Plaintiff,

County.

No.......

VS.

o ----

D ------- Defendant.
D------- appear by my attorney and say:
--I,
1. That the land from which I cut the timber was not
and is not owned by the plaintiff.
2. That I purchased said timber from John Doe who
then owned said land and if the plaintiff now has any interest in said land he acquired said interest subject to this
contract of purchase of said timber.
C -------- D --------- Defendant
His Attorney
By ------------------Motion for Judgment for Obstruction,of Private Wayj.
To C-------- D--------- ------ West Virginia.
Please take notice that on the ---- day of ------- , 1929,
I shall appear by my attorney before the circuit court of
County, West Virginia, at the iCourt House in
the opening of said court or as soon there-at
after as the matter can be heard and move for a judgment
On the ----day of
against you for the sum of .......
, 1929, I was and ever since have been possessed
of a certain tract of land in ---------- West Virginia,
bounded on the North by lands of ------- , on the East
and South by the land of -------- and on the West by
lands belonging to you, and I had a right of way from my
land over your land to the highway. On the said day you
built a high fence across the said way and have ever since
maintained said fence so that I have been thereby prevented
from using said way.
Dated this ----day of ------- , 1929.
A--------- B --------- Plaintiff
His Attorney
By -------------------
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Notice of Defense to Motion for Judgment for Obstructing
of Private Way.
State of West Virginia,
------ County, SS:
In the Circuit Court of --------A ------------- Plaintiff,

County.

No.......

'vs.

C------- D ------- Defendant.
I, C ------- D------- appear by my attorney and say
that the plaintiff had no legal right of way as alleged, but
had been crossing said land only by my permission.
C--------- D--------- Defendant
By ------------------His Attorney
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